There seems to be general agreement now that the intelligence reports supplied to the British and American governments, and used as justification for going to war in a tearing hurry, very much overstated the danger which Saddam's regime posed.

The question is whether this was because the "intelligence community" (to use the bizarre term that is now in vogue) got it wrong because of inadequacies, or because, under pressure from the politicians (or in anticipation of their wishes, in a nudge-and-wink way), the intelligence reports were distorted so as to strengthen the case for going to war without delayy.

The other question which is looming is, how to interpret the refusal to allow the weapons inspectors the time that they were asking for, in the light of increasing cooperation being shown by Saddam's regime (induced by the military build-up on his borders).

Could this have been coloured by a worry that, given further and fuller inspections, evidence might be forthcoming that Saddam's claim to have destroyed chemical and biological weapons was actually true, so undermining the official casus belli?

For in fact it now appears likely that this claim of Saddam actually was probably true. The puzzle, for which several answers have been suggested, is, why he didn't cooperate in demonstrating that it was true, rather than playing silly buggers by dragging his feet when it came to meeting the demands of the inspectors.