Here's some more:

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/230_beinin.html

On July 11, 1948, Aharon Cohen, director of the Arab Affairs Department of the socialist-Zionist Mapam party in Israel, received a carbon copy of a military intelligence report. Israel, a state less than two months old, was embroiled in a war with neighboring Arab states that would last until 1949. . Cohen was upset to read the report's conclusion that 70 percent of these Arabs had fled due to "direct, hostile Jewish operations against Arab settlements" by Zionist militias, or the "effect of our hostile operations on nearby (Arab) settlements."[1] One month before Cohen received this report, Mapam's political committee had issued a resolution opposing "the tendency to expel the Arabs from the Jewish state," in response to Cohen's warnings that such operations were taking place.

Over the course of Arab-Jewish fighting between 1947 and 1949, well over 700,000 Palestinians were made refugees, the majority of them by direct expulsion or the fear of expulsion or massacre. The largest single expulsion occurred after Israeli conquest of the towns of Lydda and Ramla in the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv corridor during July 9-18, 1948. Some 50,000 Palestinians were driven out of their homes in these towns by Israeli forces whose deputy commander was Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister of Israel from 1974-1977 and 1992-1995. Some two dozen massacres of Palestinians were perpetrated by pre-state Zionist militias and Israeli forces, the most infamous of them on April 9-10, 1948, at the village of Deir Yassin.

Yet after the war, it was Mapam's prescription for the conduct of Israeli forces—rather than the reality of expulsion—that became official Israeli history, and eventually, came to define the Jewish Israeli collective memory of what happened in 1948. For decades, the state of Israel, and traditional Zionist historians, argued that the Palestinian Arabs fled on orders from Arab military commanders and governments intending to return behind the guns of victorious Arab armies which would "drive the Jews into the sea." Consequently, the Zionist authorities would admit little or no responsibility for the fate of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants. This was not due to lack of adequate information. Ample evidence from Zionist sources from the period of the 1948 war and immediately afterwards indicates that members of the military and political elite, secondary leaders and intellectuals close to them knew very well what happened to the Palestinian Arabs in 1948, to say nothing of rank-and-file soldiers and kibbutz members who actually expelled Palestinians, expropriated their lands and destroyed their homes. But soon after the fighting, Zionist and Israeli state officials began to consolidate an official discourse that enabled most Israeli Jews to "forget" what they once "knew"—that during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war a large number of Palestinian Arabs were ethnically cleansed from the territories that became the state of Israel."


http://www.angeltowns.com/members/palestine/articles/Morris.htm

"Shlaim, in his well-argued, generally well-founded book had maintained that (a) years of Zionist-Hashemite contacts and shared political interests had resulted, in 1946-47, in the conclusion of an unwritten agreement between the leadership of the Yishuv and 'Abdallah, king of Jordan, not to fight each other but to split Palestine between them, with the Hashemites (rather than the Palestinians) receiving what is today called the West Bank, and eventually to make peace; (b) in early 1948, Britain tacitly approved the Yishuv-Hashemite agreement by supporting a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank (rather than the creation in that territory of an independent, Husayni-led Palestinian state, as the UN General Assembly had ruled), and cautioned 'Abdallah not to attack the Jewish state; (c) the Yishuv-Hashemite agreement, while somewhat shaken, in effect weathered the Jewish-Palestinian battles of November 1947-May 1948, and resulted in limited and indecisive warfare between the Israel Defence Forces and Jordan's army, the Arab Legion, in May 1948-April 1949; and (d) following the war, 'Abdallah wanted to reach peace with Israel but due to the internal weaknesses of his position and Israeli unwillingness to make concessions, no peace treaty was achieved...

...The real question about the Jewish Agency-Hashemite agreement is not whether it existed but what happened to it in the course of the Israeli-Jordanian battles of May-July 1948. Clearly, it partially unravelled in April 1948 under the impact of the Haganah's military successes, the gradual disintegration of Palestinian society, and the Dayr Yasin massacre. 'Abdallah felt unable to stand aside or to break ranks publicly with the other Arab leaders.

But did he really renege on the agreement? ...On 10 May 1948 Ben-Gurion sent Golda Meir to meet 'Abdallah once again in a last-ditch effort to avert a Yishuv-Hashemite clash. Returning to Tel Aviv, she reported to the Mapai Central Committee: "We met [on 10 May] amicably. He is very worried and looks terrible. He did not deny that there had been talk and understanding between us about a desirable arrangement, namely that he would take the Arab part [of Palestine]. . . . "But 'Abdallah had said that he could now, on 10 May, only offer the Jews "autonomy" within an enlarged Hashemite kingdom. He added that while he was not interested in invading the areas allocated for Jewish statehood, the situation was volatile. But he voiced the hope that Jordan and the Yishuv would conclude a peace agreement once the dust had settled.(16)

On 15 May the Arab Legion, along with the other Arab armies, invaded Palestine. But far from unravelling, the agreement, at least in 'Abdallah's mind, appeared to hold fast. 'Abdallah's troops kept meticulously to the 17 November 1947 scenario: At no point in May, or thereafter, did the Arab Legion attack the Jewish state's territory. The Legion occupied the northern half of the West Bank and advanced as far westward as Latrun, Lydda, and Ramla (all UN-allocated Arab areas); and, acceding to local Arab pressures, drove into (Arab) East Jerusalem, essentially to secure the area (and its holy sites, including 'Abdallah's father's tomb on the Temple Mount) against Jewish conquest. But Jerusalem, allocated by the United Nations partition resolution neither to Jew nor to Arab, had not been covered in the Meir-'Abdallah agreement. Moreover, apart from securing the Old City (including conquering its Jewish Quarter), the Legion had refrained from attacking Jewish positions and areas (except for forays around the Mandelbaum Gate and the Notre Dame Monastery designed to safeguard the Legion's line of communication from Ramallah into the city).

No doubt, 'Abdallah was not motivated solely by his adherence to the agreement. His army was small, numbering only some 7,500-9,000 troops at the start of hostilities, and he hardly had enough soldiers to secure the West Bank, let alone attempt to conquer Jewish state territory or fight in costly street battles in West Jerusalem. Moreover, the British had warned him against attacking the Jewish state (see below), and he had promised to refrain from doing so.

Before 15 May, various Jewish officials - Yaacov Shimoni, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), etc. - feared that 'Abdallah might attack the Jewish state nonetheless ("Can any Arab be trusted?"). But in effect, when it came to brass tacks, 'Abdallah adhered strictly to the letter and spirit of the agreement. Rather, it was the Jews who broke it when the Haganah/IDF repeatedly attacked the Legion in Latrun (in late May and June), in Lydda-Ramla (in July), and near Tarqumiya (October). It was Ben-Gurion - because he sought to lift the siege of Jerusalem and expand Jewish territorial holdings beyond what the UN had earmarked - who violated it."