Then the law abidding Sunni Arab had better tell his Sheik/his Emir/his Immam in no uncertain terms that they had better stop encouraging violence and supporting the insurrection and that they had better open a dialogue with the elected Iraqi Government. As the current situation continues, the Sunni Arabs progressively have less and less to bargain with, Al-Sadr fully recognises this. That is why he and his Shia followers will not be goaded into the "civil war" that the Sunni Arabs so desperately want.

If they cannot trust the police force or Iraqi Army they had better start enlisting into it, instead of fighting it. That they should have done from Day 1.

You quote one sentence from the entire article. How about these passages Ron?

1) "He was wrestling with the same dilemma as many Sunni insurgent leaders, beginning to doubt the wisdom of their alliance with al-Qaida extremists.

Another insurgent commander told me: "At the beginning al-Qaida had the money and the organisation, and we had nothing." But this alliance soon dragged the insurgents and then the whole Sunni community into confrontation with the Shia militias as al-Qaida and other extremists massacred thousands of Shia civilians. Insurgent commanders such as Abu Omar soon found themselves outnumbered and outgunned, fighting organised militias backed by the Shia-dominated security forces."

The main inference here Ron, is that if the Sunni Arabs had not initiated the sectarian violence they would never have felt the backlash of the Shia militia.

2) "Abu Omar had proposed encouraging young Sunni men to enlist in the army and the police to redress the sectarian balance. He suggested giving the Americans a ceasefire, in an attempt to stop ministry of interior commandos' raids on his area. Al-Qaida had said no to all these measures; now he wanted other Iraqi insurgent commanders to support him."

Had Sunni Arabs engaged and enlisted in the police force and army from day one those units would not now be Shia dominated.