Perhaps you'd like to share the substance of Dr. Blix's report to the UN with the folks...


"On 7th of December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1441 and within the time stipulated by the Security Council.

In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.

One might have expected that in preparing the declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM documents (of 1994 ?) and the so-called Amorim report of March 1999. These are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators have often cited.

While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current unresolved disarmament issues and key remaining disarmament tasks in response to requirements in Resolution 1284, we find the issues listed in the two reports I mentioned as unresolved professionally justified. These reports do not contend the weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq; but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies which raise question marks, which must be straightened out if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM.

Regrettably, the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that will eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq's letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the president of the Security Council on 24th of January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.

I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered, and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons. The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tons, and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponized. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization, and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.

There are also indications that the agent was weaponized. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost due to bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.

I would now like to turn to the so-called Air Force document that I have discussed with the council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998, and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC. The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1998, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tons. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocked warheads in a bunker at the storage depot 170 kilometers southwest of Baghdad was much-publicized. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved here in the past two years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. Investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve, but rather points to the issue of several thousand of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard, and has set up a committee of investigation.

Since then, it has reported that it has found further four chemical rockets at a storage depot in al-Taji.

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site the laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard precursor.

Whilst I'm addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19th of December last year, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at al-Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM's supervision and had installed at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.

I turn to biological weapons. I mentioned the issue of anthrax to the council on previous occasion, and I come back to it, as it is an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of this biological warfare agent, which, it states, it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision, or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was indeed destroyed in 1991.

As I reported to the council on the 19th of December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilos, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged, as reported, in Iraq's submissions to the Amorim panel in February of 1999. As a part of its 7 December, 2002, declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate, as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.
In a letter the 24th of January, this year, to the president of the Security Council, Iraq's foreign minister stated that, I quote, "All imported quantities of growth media were declared," unquote. This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of the media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax.

I turn, Mr. President, now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained Scud-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of Scud missiles as targets in the development of anti-ballistic missile defense system during the 1980s, yet no technical information has been produced about that program, or data on the consumption of the missiles.

There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years, presented by Iraq in the declaration as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions. Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fueled missile named Al-Samoud II, and a solid propellant missile called Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 kilometers, with the Al-Samoud II being tested to a maximum of 183 kilometers, and the Al Fatah to 161 kilometers. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi armed forces, even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development. The Al-Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 millimeters. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 millimeters. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.

During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programs. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum of 150 kilometers.

These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 kilometers are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the meantime, we have asked Iraq to cease flight test of both missiles.

In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile-production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM's supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles.

Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import which has been taking place during the last two years of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December -- (inaudible word). Foremost among these is the import of 300 rockets engines which may be used for the Al-Samoud 2.

Iraq has also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation, and guidance and control system. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq. That is, Iraq or some company in Iraq circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.

Mr. President, I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic.

Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and, if no evidence is presented to the contrary, they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq; but nor is it or, I think, anyone else, after the inspections between 1991 and '98, presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full transparency may, may help.

Let me be specific. Information provided by member states tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report what we might find, as well as any denial of access.

So far, we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122-millimeter warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other items, declare what may be found, and destroy it under our supervision?
When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are no more documents; all existing relevant documents have presented, we are told; all documents relating to the biological weapons program were destroyed together with the weapons.

However, Iraq has all the archives of the government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds, and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.

In response to the recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages, which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons program. Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues.
The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium, support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their workplaces. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated, and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes.