"The last decade saw the publication of several books by revisionist Israeli historians or 'new' historians as they are sometimes called. Most of this literature focuses on the creation of the State of Israel and on the first Arab-Israeli war. The new historians have challenged many of the claims of the traditional Zionist rendition of events. They challenged the claim that the military balance in 1948 overwhelmingly favoured the Arabs; that the Palestinian refugees left of their own free will; that all the neighbouring Arab countries were united in their determination to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state; and that Arab intransigence was alone responsible for the persistent political deadlock after the guns fell silent.

Motti Golani is a young Israeli historian whose work has focused on the second Arab-Israeli war which is usually called the Suez War in the West and the Sinai Campaign in Israel. His book has many strengths. It is based on careful and comprehensive research, especially in the Israel State Archives and in the IDF Archive. The arguments and conclusions are supported by strong evidence from primary sources, some of which is used here for the first time. It sheds a great deal of new light not just on the war itself but on related subjects such as civil-military relations in Israel, the policy-making process in defence and foreign affairs, the extraordianry influence exerted by Cheif of Staff Modshe Dayan in pushing Israel into war, and the collusion with Britain and France which preceded the attack on Egypt.

Last but not least, Dr Golani shows honesty and courage in following the evidence to its logical conclusion, regardless of how damaging it might be to the offical or semi-official Israeli version of this war. As the title of his book suggests, Dr Golani holds that the 1956 war was not imposed on Israel by her enemies but deliberately sought by her. Although the Czech arms deal announced in September 1955 began to tip the military balance in Egypt's favour, the balance was restored by secret arms acquisitions from France and in October 1956 Israel did not face any imminent threat of Egyptian attack or any other serious threat to her basic security. Israel's motives for embarking on this military venture included the consolidation of the alliance with France, territorial expansion, the overthrow of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the establishemt of a new political order in the Middle East. Whatever else it might have been, the Sinai Campaign was not for Israel a war of ein breira (Hebrew - "there is no alternative")."

Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign 1955 - 1956