10. January 14, 1984. State Department memo acknowledges United States shipment of "dual-use" export hardware and technology. Dual use items are civilian items such as heavy trucks, armored ambulances and communications gear as well as industrial technology that can have a military application.

"That can have" is the operative phrase here along with "civilian items".

11. March, 1986. The United States with Great Britain block all Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons, and on March 21 the US becomes the only country refusing to sign a Security Council statement condemning Iraq's use of these weapons.

During this time no vetoes by either US or the UK were used.

Any possible connection here between the Security Council Resolution and the "blocking" activity being because of the resolution only condemning use of such weapons by only one side in the conflict, thereby leaving it perfectly legitimate for the otherside to deploy and use such weapons as they did in fact do?

UN condemnation would not have prevented the use of "biological weapons" as they were not covered by any convention or protocol at the time.

12. May, 1986. The US Department of Commerce licenses 70 biological exports to Iraq between May of 1985 and 1989, including at least 21 batches of lethal strains of anthrax.

"Biological exports" from the Centre for Disease Control (Is CDC a well known and reputed arms manufacturer Amos?) Or were these samples sent for research? If so what research was stated by the Iraqi Government? If 21 of the 70 were described as being lethal were the remaining 49 benign? CDC does not manufacture weapons so it can hardly be in the best position to export them, or is that a bit too logical and rational an argument to accept?

13. May, 1986. US Department of Commerce approves shipment of weapons grade botulin poison to Iraq.

Your thinking here Amos is that weapons grade must equate to weapons use right? That is why you included this gem.

Tell me Amos how would you test your chemical and biological defence systems and counter-measures? How would you know that they would be of any use? To undertake and carry-out these tests you have to have the very thing, or type of thing you are faced with.

To make chemical or biological agents is relatively simple, to weaponise them is extremely difficult, the west (NATO) gave up on that about fifty years ago.

In the UK the research establishment at Porton Down continued to make weapons grade agents long after the UK renounced the use of these weapons. All of the agents made at Porton Down and the research that went on there was required to test suits, respirators, seals and cleaning systems and develope antidotes.