> There were those in Britain who favoured a war with Germany before that country became too strong; there were those in France who wanted revenge for the war of the 1870s; and pan-Slavism was as much a problem as pan-Germanism.

But none of those nations took those steps. Nothing done by the other countries over previous decades even begins to match the policies and *actions* of Germany in 1914. Austrian designs on Serbia were Germany's perfect opportunity to launch the war it had decided was inevitable and that it would win.

I can't imagine a political situation in 1914 that would have prompted Britain, France, or Russia to launch a war in Europe while Germany remained peacefully within its borders. It was widely realized that Europe was so reliant on mutual economic and financial ties that any big war would result in national economic collapses. As it did.

Those predictions didn't stop the Kaiser. He and his generals thought Germany could win "by Christmas."

Unlike Britain, Germany and Austria had long had universal conscription and a truly pervasive militarist bent. (In Germany, pacifist organizations were banned by law.) Germany believed its "destiny" as the "bravest" and "most highly civilized" nation was to control Europe. When Russia surrendered early in 1918, Germany seized most of European Russia and its resources. For Berlin, the case for innate German superiority had been proved.

Germany did "fear" France, Britain, and Russia, in more or less that order, mainly because their geography stood in the way of German expansion. And that expansion (according to the incredibly influential philosopher Hegel) was required for the "health" of the nation and (once pseudo-Darwinism got mixed into it) was actually demanded by "survival of the fittest." Nietzsche's writings are filled with ignorant praise of war - in the abstract.

No nation was immune from these influences, and colonial wars were partly based on similar assumptions. But nowhere outside of Germany did warlike ideals turn into reckless policy against populous, neighboring, sophisticated, technologically and industrially advanced, and culturally related European states. And nowhere else was the risk of a continent-wide explosion thought to be a perfectly reasonable policy choice.

Even more amazing is that the later followers of Mussolini and Hitler seem not to have learned anything from it.