The factt is, large numbers of men did volunteer in the early part of the war. Whether they were misled into doing that or not is a subjective judgement, not a "fact" - basically it comes down to whether you ggree with their choice or not. Equally true, even larger numbers of men did not volunteer but were later in the war compelled to join as conscripts whatever their wishes. But those kind of issues aren't ones where the views of academic historians are partiularly relevant.

The suggestion that there was no choice for Britain but to go to war in 1914 is very dubious indeed. Germany did not declare war on Britain, and there was no indication whatsoever of any wish to do so. What is true is that Germany did attack France, and invade Belgium in the course of doing so. Failing to declare war might have meant evading treaty commitments - but then invading Belgium involved Germany in not complying with treaty commitments. All countries break treaties when it suits them. Britain has definitely done so. Declaring war was a matter of choice.

Once again, it's not a matter of what academic historians decide, but of a judgement about what was the right thing to do - which is coloured by our knowledge of what the consequences were of the decision made. (There is an ambiguity in the the term "right" involved here. A choice that is "right" in one sense may well be catstrophically wrong in the other sense.)

As for the question as to the competence of the military command, while it may be that historians can bring to bear on it a fuller understanding of how the relevant decisions were made, and that could make it more possible to see them as rational, the outcome of episodes such as the Somme attack, in which enormous losses were sustained for absolutely no gain does not leave open the possibility that objectively the tactics involved were anything other than disastrous and mistaken.