"In fact, Britain entering was anticipated and welcomed by many German voices."

I dare say the more "hawkish" elements welcomed the prospect of Britain entering the war – Four years later they certainly rued the day they voiced such enthusiasm. Being a nation with no experience or reason to fully appreciate or understand the significance of a naval blockade, in the course of the First World War the civilian populations of both Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire certainly suffered greatly. In Germany it was civil unrest that brought the Kaiser's reign to an end, while the population of Austria was near starvation.

"The famous "scrap" quotation is normally read in the sense of "Of course, that old treaty cannot be the real reason for Britain to enter the war!" - an opinion shared by most."

Well of course Grishka if you had actually printed out the quote in context you would see that the exact opposite was the case.

The official report prepared by the British ambassador to Germany, Sir Edward Goschen, which recounted the events of 4 August 1914:

"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated.

His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word - "neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded - just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her.

All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants.

He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked.

That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?"

I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument."

The Germans were fully aware of the risk involved in invading Belgian territory but they thought that they could advance swiftly enough and deliver a decisive blow against France before Britain could intervene in any significant way. With the French knocked out and defeated the Triple Entente would collapse and a peace could be negotiated by Germany from a position of strength, a grave miscalculation of the part of the Germans.

The "Entente Cordiale " signed in 1904 between Great Britain and France was primarily designed to check German colonial ambitions. This agreement was expanded in 1907 to include Russia and formed the basis of what was known as the "Triple Entente" which became a full blown military alliance in 1911.