As the philosophy of science is forming a backdrop to this thread, I thought I'd better explain why I chose the rules and approach I did. They weren't picked because I thought pete would have difficulty with them, but because the philosophy demands it.

It is insufficient to define a model that encompasses all the known facts. Here's one that does that of the top of my head "Nothing has an explanation, but may appear to have". Every fact in the world fits that, but it is of no use. No, an essential component of a useful model is that it explains things. Now, by and large a model only expainns a part of reality - the theory of evolution does not explain the theory of gravity for instance. So we need to restrict our questions to the right problem domain, but once we do that we can test whether creationist theories are better at explaining than evolutionist theories. And we do that not by determining whether a ffact can be incorporated by simply by asking questions and seeing whether it can give precise answers. Hence my rule which says !asically "precision is an answer, waffle isn't"