Amos,

Your point is fully acknowledged, US air power was a crucial and deciding factor. My comments address the contention by some that the US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban - they didn't, they assisted, they did not invade.

The arrival of foreign troops in anything that could be called significant numbers was something that was negotiated with the Northern Alliance Command Council after the Taliban had been expelled from Kabul. If memory serves me correctly first troops to arrive at Baghram Airport were Royal Marines and there was much to-ing and fro-ing to establish what they could and couldn't do. They were restricted solely to within the airport perimeter and they were tasked with making the airport safe, prior to the arrival of Mohamed Karzai. Further negotiations led to that initial force being increased in size to make the road between the airport and Kabul safe.

Don thanks for the links,

The first is quite good and clearly shows that the TAP was a dead duck about two years before GWB came into office ("In 1998, after the U.S. bombed Al-Qaeda training camps in retaliation for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, UNOCAL pulled out of the pipeline negotiations.") .

The second, was purely an anti-Cheney rant which had almost as much to say about his "baton twirling" wife as it did about the man himself. The article seems to concentrate on the contract awarded to Halliburton prior to operations in Iraq earlier this year:

"Halliburton's construction and engineering subsidiary has been paid nearly $1 billion through government contracts containing profit-guarantees, and various other contracts initiated since the company's former CEO arrived in the White House. Halliburton has built military bases in the former Soviet Union and Turkey, and it made $33 million building jail cells for terrorists at Camp X-Ray. (In all fairness, even these contracts don't make up for Cheney's major accomplishment as CEO, an acquisition which is expected to cost Halliburton upwards of $4 billion in asbestos liabilities.)

Just before the Iraq war started, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded Halliburton an "emergency" contract for oil fields reconstruction, which was awarded without the usual government bidding process because of said "emergency" (and despite the fact that the invasion wasn't on any particular timetable and the fact it had been in the works for a year and a half).

The deal was authorized for up to $7 billion, but the Army didn't trash the country with sufficient enthusiasm to make the whole amount, and the actual size of the deal is now estimated at $600 million (assuming Halliburton survives the lawsuits from competitors who inexplicably feel that something fishy is going on here).

A disappointment to be sure, but Cheney has at least two more years to make it up to them. And then there's always Syria... And Iran... And..."

This subject has been discussed before on this forum, but taking a look at the correspondence on the subject we get the following:

The correspondence centres around letters by Senators Waxman and Dingell to the US Army and to the GAO.

Waxman Letter 26th March 2003 to the US Army:
In which Waxman refers to the contract to extinguish oil field fires in Iraq. His concerns relate to the fact that there appears to be no set time limit; No set cost limit; That the contract is based on a cost plus basis.

Specific issues raised by Waxman, related to,
1. Failure on the part of the administration to open the bids to competitive tendering;

2. The Army only went to Kellog Brown & Root;

3. Waxman wanted estimated costs and duration of this contract;

4. He also wanted details relating to contract structure;

5. Confirmation that the award of this contract was in compliance with Federal Laws and Regulations;

6. He wanted to know what safeguards were in place against contractor cost inflation;

7. He finally asked questions relating to the time lag between contract awarded and when it was announced.

The US Army responded on 8th April 2003 as follows:

A. To points 1 & 2 above Waxman was referred to a Frame Agreement Contract awarded to Halliburton in 1997/8. A contract won on the basis of competitive tender. The contract for work in Iraq in relation to oil field fires was awarded to KB&R as the US Army's existing Frame Agreement Contractor. Other considerations that influenced the Army's decision were, type of work likely to be involved, required security clearances; unnecessary duplication of effort; Timing.

B. To point 3 above, Waxman was told that estimates were made (7 billion US$ and 2 years - Kuwait model) but there was no way of quantifying an exact scope of work. It was a contingency measure - hence cost plus basis of the contract (Costs + 2-5%), it could not be done any other way.

(Note: Normal mark up would have been around the 10-15% level for oil-field construction operations - Dresser, who Halliburton took over in 1996 operated on a profit margin of 20%)

C. Point 4 - answered short term contract on cost+ basis

D. Point 5. - award of contract did comply with Federal Laws and Regulations (This statement was later backed up by the GAO). KB&R were existing Frame Agreement Contractors, that contract having been awarded after competitive tender procedures had been followed.

(Note: Had Halliburton/KB&R not been awarded this work they could have sued the US Goverment for breach of that contract)

E. Point 6 - By process of negotiated total estimated cost, agreed before work orders are issued. Actual costs justified and verified after which a profit margin of between 2 and 5 % is added.

F. Contract award was 8.03.03; announcement was made 24.03.03 - Contract awarded because SH stated intention that Iraqi oil fields would be sabotaged in the event of US/UK military action. Announcement delayed until 24th for security reasons. Announcement prior to this might have triggered early destruction of the oil-fields by SH and the Ba'athist regime.

Waxman and Dingell put the same points to the GAO and got the same answers (Waxman/Dingell letter 8.04.03)

There was a further exchange of letters between Waxman and the US Army (Waxman letter 10.04.03). In this letter Waxman sought further clarification on points previously raised. Clarifications were addressed by the Army who provided greater detail.

Further exchange of letters between Waxman and the Army (16.04.03) relating to reports in the Washington Post and in the Wall Street Journal. In response the Army referred the Senator to answers given in previous correspondence. After this exchange of letters the matter seems to have died a death.

Round Robin Hood's barn once more - with all points covered, as they have been in my previous posts - not one challenged in detail, still, Don, your resorting to to the tactic where if you can't attack the arguement attack the man is plainly seen for what it is.