Wal, I think what we're trying to do with the evolutionary model is account for changes in physical forms through time. And the issue is, given the demonstrated mechanics of genes, not of organisms, and given a simple model with a small set of rules based on genes' behaviours, can we account for what we find in evidence in the world? I think the answer is yes with qualifications. '
I do not believe there is no intentionality in the world, but I believe it is very misleading to try and locate a single source.
I do not believe the matrix of colliding and interacting intentionality in the world can be particularly quantified. I also do not think it is necessary to explain the evolution of life forms.
Lamarcke's case for intentional evolution by the organism doesn't hold much water. The fact is that we don't need to add any other ingredients into the model to explain bserved phenomena.
We should probably not ignore the existence of intent, and of creative postulates such as are behind live communciation, art, music and such, just because the evolution of body forms can be explained without adding it in.
Unless, of course, you really believe that all humans are nothing more than their bodies, which I would argue is unjustified in light of non-particle phenomena such as understanding, actual perception (as distinguished from light-responses), and the ability to intend things.
A pure phyics-based biologist would argue (beyond his sphere of expertise) that these are just "emergent complex behaviors" deriving from the same small set of rules and elemts generating a much larger set of transactions until a new plateau of complex behavior emerges.
But believe that the "qualia"* argument kind of goes beyond those boundaries and interjects non-quantitative (and indeed non-quantifiable) components to the puzzle which are not accounted for.
A
*"Often referred to a "raw feels", qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental states such as sensations and emotions—the "what it is like" to see red, feel pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative features by which we identify them through introspection."