But quite apart from the specific problem of the world itself, can the Being of what we encounter proximally within-the-world be reached ontologically by this procedure? When we speak of material Thinghood , have we not tacitly posited a kind of Being - the constant presence-at-hand of Things - which is so far from having been rounded out ontologically by subsequently




            (By the way, this is going, particularly for the 'dull'
                bit.)


(to resume)   by subsequently endowing entities with value predicates, that these value-characters are rather just ontological characteristics of those entities which have the kind of Being possessed by Things?


       (Please note he's just asked you a question. To continue..)

                        Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all about the Being of goods, b u t w o u l d            m e r e l y   p r e s u p p o s e a g a i n t h a t g o o d s   h a v e p u r e p r e s e n c e - a t - h a n d a s t h e i r    k i n d o f B e i n g.





If you'd like more of that (Heidegger), just say the word.

Ivor