1.        Teribus, my comment on the outcome of Afghanistan had no relation to the number of troops committed, whatever your supposition. I am referring to the hearts and minds aspect of the campaign. The Taleban would have found is considerably more difficult to garner support with a population that actually welcomed the coalition.

A news flash for you Gervase, the Taleban have never, repeat, never been "popular" in Afghanistan, not even amongst the Pashtu population. The only reason the Taleban ever became so prominent in Afghanistan was because they eradicated the worst of the corruption and excesses of the former "Mujihadeen" warlords after the expulsion of the Russians and offered some semblance of security to the people of Afghanistan but it came at a price – they were never liked but they were perceived generally as being the lesser of two evils in a situation where the "people" didn't have any real choice or say in the matter. Whatever "support" the Taleban have "garnered" in Afghanistan is down to fear and oppression, they are given little or nothing voluntarily from the population, they do however take a great deal at point of gun, and that Gervase includes "fighting men", who, obviously under such recruiting circumstances do not really fight all that hard.

Oh, by the bye that I got from what my son has told me of operations in Afghanistan. As to the specific question you asked. They get a great deal of information from the "local" population, but that information in terms of degree is tempered by the reality that ISAF cannot "hold" territory, not surprising really as it was never meant that they should to any significant extent.

As in discussions on Iraq, with Afghanistan what is completely ignored are the Afghan elements involved, the new Afghan National Army and Afghan Police Force. The former according to my son, is an organisation which is showing great promise, the latter he says are nowhere near as well trained, lazy and corrupt, in short an unreliable problem wherever they go. The ANA has gained the respect of those operating alongside it and my son's hope is that the Army or part of the Army takes over the role of the Afghan Police Force. The funny thing here is that if you compare that to what Doug Beattie's experiences were as recorded in his book "An Ordinary Soldier" it is the exact opposite. He reckoned that the APF were much better than the ANA. A serving member of the R.I.R. he worked with mentoring teams attached to the AFP. My son a serving Marine works with ANA Units, my son says that in taking up static positions near villages the ANA do not set up road-blocks and demand "tolls" from the locals, whereas the AFP do. AFP personnel are more often than not local to the area they work in and have excellent contacts with local Taleban a situation Beattie found astonishing in his time with them. ANA Units consist of Afghans from all over and they have a far greater sense of "Unit" loyalty, which under fire makes them a bit more effective and not being "local" they are less susceptible to outside pressures.

In Afghanistan there was no US "Invasion" as there was in Iraq. Therefore in Afghanistan nobody fought either American, British, Canadian, Dutch, Danish, etc, etc troops. In Iraq, the Iraqi Army, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard and Saddam Fedayeen fought US and British troops and were defeated, that combatant situation was carried over when the UN MNF came into being, not surprising really as it devolved to the same players as the only people willing and capable of taking on the job.


The Pashtu, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbeks and the other ethnic groups that make up Afghanistan put a great deal of store in how you fight your enemy. The Taleban have lost a great deal of "face" in regressing to their bombing campaign. No longer do they dare face their enemies as the "Mujahideen" faced the Russians. The bombs the Taleban and Al-Qaeda now rely on, kill more Afghan civilians than they do "foreign infidels" and that, believe it or not Gervase, has registered and the Taleban are not liked because of that – the same thing helped in settling the hash of "Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq" in 2007.

2.        I introduced PIRA attacks in Ulster as an analogy because you seemed to be labouring under the delusion that attacks by Islamic militants in Iraq and Afghanistan somehow "don't count" as terrorism; as though only PIRA attacks on the UK mainland counted. Note the "as though".

Not exactly true is it Gervase.   I was talking about terror, and terrorism and whether or not it had "flourished" – You introduced militant Islam as an example of terrorism that had flourished as a result of the actions of the US and her allies, you even provided a link to illustrate this. When it was pointed out to you that most of the examples identified by yourself in that list had other causes completely unconnected from religion, you threw in the PIRA. Both you and I have both agreed to stick to what is actually said – so stop introducing red herrings and desist from attributing to me opinions and points of view that I do not subscribe to or hold.

3.        "Why did the very first meeting of the National Security Council following Bush's inauguration have the invasion of Iraq on its agenda?"

Could that have anything to do with the NSC's work for the three previous years where they were informing the then President of the United States of America, one William Jefferson Clinton, that potentially Iraq posed the greatest external threat to the security and interests of the United States of America?

After the November 2000 Presidential election, and on change of President and Administration in January 2001, can you think of any reason why the opinion of the National Security Council, or their advice, regarding that threat evaluation would change?

Having just taken over the job as President of the United States of America, do you think it likely that if your National Security Council and your Intelligence Agencies inform you of what in their opinion is the greatest threat to the nation, you as President, would shuffle it off to some back-burner for attention at a latter date??

4.        "And hindsight is, indeed, a wonderful thing. I remember one armchair general saying that it was highly unlikely that there would be a war because Bush would never launch an attack without the full and official sanction of the UN, and anyway, if the Americans did decide to invade it would have to be an entirely amphibious assault and that would never work, so would everyone please calm down. Ring any bells?"


Ah I'm glad you dug that up – Bobert always classifies me as having been "Gung-Ho" and all out for the war since long before Day 1. I on the other hand in the run up firmly believed that it would never happen – I think I am on record on this very thread for stating that my reasoning behind that point of view was that I could not believe that Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist regime in Iraq could possibly be so bloody stupid as to think that GWB and the USA was bluffing in the wake of the attacks of 11th September, 2001 that showed them how vulnerable to asymmetric attack the USA was.

At the time I held the belief outlined in your summation of my position as an "armchair general" that the US had no guaranteed access to land bases in the Persian Gulf region. After I posted that view Kuwait; Bahrain and Qatar came forward and granted the US leave to use bases on their territory to support any action against Iraq. I believe another important factor I predicted was the support of Turkey. That piece of the "jig-saw" did not fall into place and it cost the US dearly, the insurrection in the west and central provinces of Iraq would have been far shorter if Iraq's western border could have been sealed immediately.

5.        "Think Malaya rather than Vietnam; Templeton rather than Westmoreland."

By the bye Gervase if it's the man who said, "The answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people", its Templer (As in Field Marshal Sir Gerald Walter Robert Templer KG, GCB, GCMG, KBE) not Templeton.   Here you are comparing apples and oranges and you know it. Much in the same way as Obama is waving his Afghan "Surge" under the direction of General David Petraeus.

If memory serves me correctly both Obama and his Vice-President Joe Biden opposed the "Surge" in Iraq and the latter was extremely derogatory and disparaging of its effectiveness when General Petraeus appeared before the Senate Committee to present his Report on Iraq in September 2007. Of course by the time the 2008 Presidential elections had come round General David Petraeus's every word had been vindicated and while Biden was left wiping the egg off his face, his running mate Barack Obama was chattering away ten to the dozen about his "surge" for Afghanistan having vehemently opposed the earlier one in Iraq. Well Gervase, like your comparison of Malaya & Vietnam, GWB's Iraq Surge & Obama's Afghan Surge are only significant in that they cannot be compared. If Obama thinks a surge of 17-19,000 troops in Afghanistan is going to have the same effect in the same time frame as George W Bush's 30,000 troop surge had in Iraq, then he is going to be a very disappointed man. My take on it is that we will have to be in Afghanistan for at least another ten years

What lessons could General Westmoreland (A complete and utter fool in my opinion) have taken from Gerald Templer to apply in Vietnam. The British in Malaya had quite a few things going for them that the Americans did not have in Vietnam, hence Templer's "Hearts and Minds" philosophy was a great deal easier to implement and those subject to it saw immediate benefits in terms of future prospects and standards of living. There was absolutely nothing that General Westmoreland could do in Vietnam that could ever come even close in terms of effectiveness to what the British accomplished in Malaya. Having coined the phrase the British have always seen the efficacy of a "Hearts and Minds" philosophy and have learned how and when to apply it, the American military have never understood it and have never applied it, they simply do not know how.