All major conflicts have a cost of entry--organizational overhead, logistics, comms, intell--and these costs require a central command and coordination if they are to be timely met. That's why men form tribes and governments. But it should be remembered as Carol implies that to meet these costs those involved must see it as worth the expense.

I think Carol's points about the new communication dynamics is very true--the effect of Twitter in Tehran is a great example. Cellphones in Beijing, too. But as a devil's advocate sort of thought, what happens when there is a legitimate cause for mobilization but the chatter prevents the organization from happening?    It is perfectly possible for a positive, legitimate cause to be balked by organized networks, and even more possible for a desperate but necessary measure (like war when under attack) to be similarly dissipated or slowed.

Just thinking aloud, here.

One of the reasons Al Qeda came into being was the outrage, to Muslims, of Christian troops mobilizing on Saudi soil. Another was the sudden disinterest in Afghanistan--populated by large numbers of multi-national jihadists armed and trained by the US--as soon as the USSR failed there. These are not the only ones but they demonstrate what happens when you ignore other people's feelings because you are calculating your own interests too single-mindedly.


A