Bobert and Dr Hans Blix's Report to the UN Security Council 27th January 2003

Bobert wishes to infer that all the problems that Dr.Hans Blix mentioned during his delivery of the UNMOVIC Report on 27th January 2003 referred to problems encountered in the past and that as of 27th January 2003 everything was just perfect and that UNMOVIC was enjoying total co-operation from the Iraqi Authorities.

Blix's report was some 104 paragraphs long

Paragraphs 1 to 4 were the introduction. At this point UNMOVIC has been back in Iraq for 60 days.

Paragraphs 5 to 14 recalls and summarises the UNSCOM period of inspections from 1991 to 1998.

Paragraphs 15 to 18 cover the period between the end of UNSCOMS time in Iraq and the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441. These four paragraphs detail the following points of importance:

The key questions:

1. How much (WMD) might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991 and possibly thereafter?

2. What, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998 when the inspectors left?

3. How it (Iraq) can be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future?

Key Statement: It was only after appeals by the secretary-general and Arab states and pressure by the United States and other member states that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that it would again accept inspections without conditions.

Paragraphs 19 to 22 cover UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and UNMOVIC Reporting frequency.

Paragraphs 23 to 25 deals generally with Iraqi co-operation and legislation that Iraq should implement:

It is in these paragraphs that Blix refers to:

"       Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process

"       That it would appear that Iraq was co-operating with regard to process, notably access

"       That they have yet to be found to be co-operating in terms of substance

"       That there are certain items of legislation that the UN require IRAQ to pass into law so that the disarmament process and civil rights obligations can be undertaken.

Paragraphs 26 to 37 deals specifically with co-operation on process:

"       Blix backs up what he said previously on co-operation on process by stating: I shall deal first with cooperation on process………. Iraq has, on the whole, cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field.

"       Blix describes the environment as being workable.

"       On access he only notes one exception to access being granted.

"       He notes problems on co-operation related to air operations. U2 surveillance flights were not permitted by Iraq counter to the requirements of resolution 1441. (The U2 surveillance flights never did take place)

"       He noted problems relating to helicopter movements to support inspections, but these were resolved by both UNMOVIC Inspectors and Iraqi Officials travelling in the same helicopters. This delaying tactic and the solution had been experienced during earlier UNSCOM inspections and should not have arisen with UNMOVIC.

"       Blix reports disturbing incidents and harassment. Allegations of intelligence gathering, again tactics used against UNSCOM inspections previously.

"       Blix reports anti-UN demonstrations in front of UNMOVIC Offices and at inspection sites. Blix also notes that "Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq with initiative or encouragement from the authorities"

Paragraphs 38 & 39 relate to Iraq's lack of co-operation in substance both paragraphs are quoted in full below:

The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programs of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusions that nothing proscribed remains.

Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441 states that this cooperation shall be "active." It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of catch as catch can. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items.

Paragraphs 40 to 46 covers the submission of Iraq's "last-chance-full-and-final" Declaration to the UN:

"       In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward.

"       Declaration of 7th December should have addressed outstanding matters dating back to UNSCOM Inspections and detailed in the Amorim Report of March 1999. As of 27th January 2003 UNMOVIC finds the issues listed in the two reports I mentioned as unresolved.

Paragraphs 47 to 58 covers the known status of the Iraqi Chemical Weapons Programme and their Declaration Document:

"       Declared, manufacture on a pilot scale only, of poor quality and unstable, therefore never weaponised. The small quantity that remained was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991 without UNSCOM supervision (A requirement at that time)

"       UNMOVIC information is in conflict with the above from documentary evidence found relating to purity and stabilisation of the agent and that the VX agent was weaponised.

"       No trace or accountability of key VX precursor chemicals which Iraq says were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq without the required UNSCOM Supervision.

"       The "Air Force Document" originally found by UNSCOM in 1998 and confiscated by Iraqi "Minders" from the UNSCOM Inspector who found it. Iraq has now produced the document and details chemical munitions (Bombs) produced and used during the Iran/Iraq War. Between records of bombs actually dropped and the figure of bombs consumed during this period there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs that are unaccounted for.

"       Chemical warheads for 122mm have been found. Iraq explains that they were overlooked from the 1991, but the facility in which they were found was built after that date. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved here in the past few years at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate.

"       More Chemical warheads found plus mustard gas precursor chemicals.

"       Equipment previously used in the production of chemical weapons and destroyed by UNSCOM was found to have been repaired and moved and used for the production of chlorine and phenols.

Paragraphs 59 to 64 covers current known status of the Iraqi Biological Weapons Programme and their Declaration Document:

"       Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

"       Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

"       There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared and that at least some of this was retained over the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was indeed destroyed in 1991.

"       In its recent submitted Declaration of 7th December 2002 Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilos, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as reported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. This serious omission appeared to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered

"       In the letter of 24th of January this year to the president of the Security Council, Iraq's foreign minister stated that, I quote, "All imported quantities of growth media were declared." This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax.

Paragraphs 65 to 75 covers the current known status of the Iraq Missile Programme and their Declaration Document:

"       As of 27th January 2003, there remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained Scud-type missiles after the Gulf War.

"       Declaration of Iraqi missile development, two systems Al-Samud II and Al-Fatah may be proscribed systems (Al-Samud range 183km with an OD of 760mm contravenes UN instructions dating back to 1994) Iraq says missiles are under development but have been deployed already with Iraqi armed forces.

"       Iraq has ignored UN instructions dated back to 1997 regarding use of engines from surface-to-air missiles for use in ballistic missiles.

"       Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM's supervision. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers.

"       Illegal import of items associated with rocket and missile development as late as December 2002.

Paragraphs 76 to 95 "Helping prove the negative" - Documentation and Personnel Interviews:

Paragraphs 79 to 87 relates to documents:

Key Paragraph 79:
UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq. But nor is it, or I think anyone else, after the inspections between 1991 and '98 presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem; evidence and full transparency may help.

"       Touches on information received from the intelligence services of other member states relating to movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons.

"       Discovery of undeclared chemical warheads for 122mm rockets and invites Iraq to - Declare what may be found and destroy it under our supervision.

"       The Iraqi excuse that - All documents relating to the biological weapons program were destroyed together with the weapons - Is not credible, citing other documentary evidence that still would exist.

"       Some NEW documents produced voluntarily 1093 pages covering 1983 to 1990

"       Over 3000 pages of new and undeclared documents relating to Iraq's nuclear programme discovered in the home of scientist may indicate that Iraqi authorities are hiding documents in private homes deliberately.

Key paragraph 87:
Any further sign of the concealment of documents will be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site will be very serious matter.

Any further concealment? - There should not have been any concealment from the outset, here Blix oversteps his authority to give Iraq a second last chance. Iraqis accept access to private sites? That was understood and required from day 1 where is this supposed co-operation in allowing inspectors to look wherever they wanted to gone?

Paragraphs 88 to 95 relate to Personnel interviews - or lack of them:

"       UNMOVIC ask for a list of persons in accordance with Resolution 1441. Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programs, as well as their missile programs, were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programs that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. When questioned further on this obvious discrepancy the Iraqis provided some 80 additional names. 3,500 does not equal 480.

"       Private interviews to the extent required just did not happen, interviewees were afraid to undergo interviews unless Iraqi Authorities were present. When the Iraqi Authorities were told that this was not acceptable and that they would have to encourage interviewees to take part in private interviews none would come forward under those circumstances.

Paragraphs 96 to 104 cover a description of UNMOVIC facilities and capabilities within Iraq.

Not quite the rosey picture that Bobert would like to portray and it gives a damning indictment of the manner that Blix carried out his role as head of UNMOVIC. With the full backing and authority of the UN Security Council he was not sent to Iraq to:

"       Put up with things
"       Request things from the Iraqi Authorities

He was sent there to demand and enforce, he was woefully ill-equipped in terms of track-record, nature and bearing to do either and expect any sort of respect or compliance from Saddam Hussein, after all Saddam Hussein had danced circles round Blix between 1991 and 1998, why should this time be any different. Saddam Hussein was perfectly aware of that and so too were the USA and the UK.