Like a great number of people in both the UK and in the USA Amos, you appear to have read what was reported as being said, forgetting to take a look at what was actually said. This is evidenced by:

The bottom line, good T, is that WMDs and delivery systems for them were claimed, as a casus belli and when looked for were not found to exist.

Now take a look at what the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC position was on the subject of Iraq disarmament, and Amos there was no single casus belli, the actual casus belli as far the UK was concerned was Iraq's refusal to honour the ceasefire commitments it agreed to at Safwan in April 1991.

The UNSCOM report of January 1999 and their previous reports while inspectors were still inside Iraq listed discrepencies and items that Iraq could not account for which is why they always spoke in terms of:

what WMD Iraq MAY, OR MAY NOT HAVE"

On the basis of the content of the UNSCOM reports it is not surprising that many involved in UNSCOM, with security, intelligence and in Government around the world fully believed that Saddam and Iraq still possessed these weapons. Saddam openly admitted in prison while waiting trial that he did everything in his power to foster that very impression.

The main objective of Safwan was to see Iraq disarmed so that it could not threaten the peace of the region or its neighbours. Finding WMD was not the primary goal, to verify beyond doubt that Iraq had disarmed was. If you cannot make the distinction between the two then there is little point in continuing the discussion.

One key executive skill that we expect leaders to have is the ability to manage data and realize, for example, when false data is being mixed in, to be alert enough to realize what is likely and what is not. Bush and Blair and many others failed this test miserably.

Utterly ridiculous Amos, you are stating that we should expect our "Leaders" all to be infallible - I have got news for you, that person does not exist. For the above to be possible your "Leader" would have to be an expert in all fields, which of course is impossible.

As described by Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold of the RUSI, the job of the JIC is to gather and analyse intelligence information and from that on any subject they submit and present that information from the best and worse case scenarios. It is then up to Cabinet to decide which to adopt, or where in between policy is set and defined. In matters of security it is normal, the default position if you like, that the worst case scenario is adopted.

By the bye, Amos, you mentioned delivery systems. British Intelligence analysis of test sights prior to the return of the inspectors indicated that Iraq had resurrected its missile development programme, and this was later confirmed by UNMOVIC. The rocket motor test beds were constructed to a specification for testing rockets four times the range of the Scuds previously used to hit targets in Israel in 1991. Work was being done with regard to changing propellant from liquid to solid and 384 rocket motors were found in Iraq that had been illegaly imported. Bottom line Amos was that none of these were allowed according to what Iraq had signed up to.

Another part of the Safwan agreement related to the repatriation of those people that Saddam had abducted from Kuwait during his brief occupation of the place. There were 605 of them, and unfortunately to Saddam they represented a major stumbling block as far as proving compliance when, primarily because by March 2003 he had, with the exception of three of them, had them killed.