Just a little review of BP-induced problems, background for the attack by their partner, Anadarko.
New York Times, Ian Urbina, "Documents show Earlier Worries for Rig's Safety," first published on front page, April 30.
Preliminary findings presented to Congress April 23.
"The problems involved the well casing and the blowout preventer, which are considered key pieces in the chain of events....."
In March, after several weeks of problems, BP was struggling with a loss of "well control."
On June 22, 2009, e. g., "BP engineers expressed concerns that the metal well casing the company wanted to use might collapse under high pressure. "This would certainly be a worst case scenario," warned Mark E. Hafle, a senior drilling engineer at BP in an internal report. "However, I have seen it happen, so know it can occur."
The company went ahead with the casing, but only after getting special permission from BP colleagues because the casing violated the company's wn safety policies and design standards."
Mr. Hafle later backed off and told a MMS and Coast Guard panel that "Nobody believed there was going to be a safety issue." Later, he refused to answer questions.
In April this year, BP engineers concluded that the casing was "unlikely to be a successful cement job," - a document referring to how the casing would be sealed to prevent gases from escaping up the well. A later document said it "is possible to fulfill MMS regulations."
A memorandum with preliminary BP findings indicated that gas was bubbling into the well (April 20), a potential sign of impending blowout.
A parade of witnesses at hearings told about bad decisions and cut corners in the days and hours before the explosion.

In March, reports or problems including "gas Kicks" and a pipe falling into the well; BP officials informed federal regulators that they were struggling with a loss of "well control.
BP reported on three occasions that the blowout preventer was leaking fluid, which the manufacturer of the device limits its ability to function properly.
Greg McCormack, Director Petroleum Extension Service, Univ. Texas, said he was surprised regulators and company officials did not halt the drilling operation at that point.
Permission was requested to delay the federally mandated test of the blowout preventer until problems were resolved; MMS at first declined but lated acquiesced.
Tests on the blowout preventer were at 6000 lb/sq. in. rather that the 10,000 psi mandated and used before the delay.