Some of the statements by modern historians regarding the causes of World War One
I don't go into quick-fixes - there is an ongoing debate on the subject, which is vast and complex and will not be resolved by quick dips into the net to prove one point or the other
On thing is certain - nobody, but nobody is claiming the jingoistic causes and effect you are
Read a book
Jim Carroll

Margaret McMillan
'The War that Ended Peace tells the story of how intelligent, well-meaning leaders guided their nations into catastrophe. These epic events, brilliantly described by one our era's most talented historians, warn of the dangers that arise when we fail to anticipate the consequences of our actions. Immersed in intrigue, enlivened by fascinating stories, and made compelling by the author's own insights, this is one of the finest books I have read on the causes of World War I.', Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State
'Once again, Margaret MacMillan proves herself not just a masterly historian but a brilliant storyteller. She brings to life the personalities whose decisions, rivalries, ambitions, and fantasies led Europe to "lay waste to itself" and triggered decades of global conflict. Hers is a cautionary tale of follies a century in the past that seem all too familiar today.', Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution
'The War That Ended Peace is a masterful explanation of the complex forces that brought the Edwardian world crashing down. Utterly riveting, deeply moving, and impeccably researched, MacMillan's latest opus will become the definitive account of old Europe's final years', Amanda Foreman

Professor Christopher Clark
The consensus since the 1960s has been to see Germany as the culprit. While Clark accepts the dominance of a diluted version of the thesis in which the German Empire deliberately chose war as a means of escaping isolation and making a bid for world power, he comments that "the Germans were not the only imperialists and not the only ones to succumb to paranoia". His Balkan emphasis and sympathy for Austria-Hungary's predicament do move the debate towards Russia's policies and actions, which Sean McMeekin's The Russian Origins of the First World War (2011) has highlighted, but for Clark there are no guilty parties. The search for blame, he argues, leads to an assumption that there were culpable decision-makers who had coherent intentions while, in fact, the problem was the lack of men with the power or capability to make decisions

Niall Fergusson
The next work of Ferguson's to attract widespread notice was The Pity of War which was an attempt to re-evaluate Britain's role in the First World War. Ferguson argues mainly that the destruction of that war, which claimed the lives of some nine million men, could well have been avoided. By his reckoning, the war between Germany and Austria on one side and Russia and France on the other was one thing: it was only through the decision of the British that a local war became a world war.
Much of Ferguson's analysis has to do with the decision that brought England into the war. He argues, for example, that Britain went to war because it misread German intentions: they saw Kaiser Wilhelm as another Napoleon, not understanding that Germany's main interests had always been focused on Eastern, rather than Western, Europe. He further argues that the proponents of sending an English army to France -- which was the trigger that made a wider war inevitable -- were a minority, and that it was only because of the lack of conviction of the rest of the cabinet ministers and party leaders that the fateful decision was made. Somewhat surprisingly, Ferguson argues that war with Germany was not even in England's economic interests, since a German overseas presence would only have worked to France's detriment, not Britain's.
Ferguson asserts that Britains decision to enter into this war was historically speaking the greatest error of the twentieth century. Britain was wrong to cross the channel and fight the Germans in 1914. It cost far too much, in blood and money, for the advantage gained. By the end of the 20th century, after all, the Germans had achieved exactly what they wanted in 1914, economic leadership of Europe.

Ruth Hennig
What really marked out the decade before 1914 was a failure of statesmanship and hope.   By 1912, most European governments had come to believe that a general European war was inevitable and that the problems which plagued them at home and abroad could no longer be settled by negotiation and diplomacy…   In these circumstances, war seemed to offer an attractive way out ...   The balance sheet in 1918 proved how wrong they had been.
R. Henig, The Origins of the First World War (1989)

Paul Schroeder
In a 1972 essay "World War I as a Galloping Gertie", Schroeder blamed Britain for the First World War. Schroeder argued that the war was a "Galloping Gertie", in events escalated out of control, sucking in all of the Great Powers into an unwanted war[3] Schroeder that the key factor in the European situation was what he claimed was Britain's "encirclement" policy directed at Austria-Hungary.[4] Schroeder argued that British foreign policy was fundamentally anti-German, and even more so, anti-Austrian[5] Schroeder claimed that 1914 was a "preventive war" forced on Germany to maintain Austria as a power, which faced with a crippling British "encirclement policy" aimed at the break-up of that state[6] His current research focuses on European international politics, 1648-1945, emphasizing systemic evolution and development.

John Clark
Although most modern historians allocate some or most of the blame to Germany, further studies have revealed that there was just as much 'will to war' in other countries. In 1991, the British historian Samuel Williamson, in his book, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, argued that Austria-Hungary was equally to blame for the war, marrying a German expansionism with an Austrian desire to expand into the Balkans.   Other historians cited militaristic/bellicose attitudes in France and Britain.   This led some historians after the 1970s to return to Winston Churchill's suggestion that war came in 1914 because of a general restlessness throughout Europe, in which everybody was turning to violence as a way of sorting out their dissatisfactions (for instance, the suffragettes, the trade unions, and both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, started to use force in the years before 1914).