Falsifiability is [...] a buzzword from Popper's philosophical system, which has never been taken very seriously outside Anglo-American academia and journalism, and is rapidly headed for oblivion even there.
That's very interesting Jack. Could you give me some pointers to the new thinking?

There is no definite label for it all, but a lot of philosophy of science has been influenced by postmodernism, or ideas related to it. Thomas Kuhn more or less started the movement; I studied briefly with Paul Feyerabend, who was perhaps the most influential of that lot. Feyerabend knew more about the history of ideas than anybody I've ever met, and he had a colossal store of examples of science operating in total disregard of Popper's ideal - instead, scientific systems try to maintain themselves by finding ways to coexist with conflicting evidence. Imre Lakatos (in "Proofs and Refutations") has a nice case study of how this works in mathematics; he called the process of sidelining inconveniences "monster-barring".

Feyerabend had more time for Popper than I ever did, but then he knew him personally and I didn't. Popper got into weird new-agey-religious bollocks with John Eccles towards the end of his life, about how the soul and brain communicate via quantum gobbledygook. I suppose he had some way of persuading himself that that was compatible with his earlier positivist doctrines. I heard Eccles talking about it once and he just sounded senile.