"[Fania] Pascal's Wittgenstein intends to accuse her of not of lying but of misrepresentation of another sort. She characterizes her feeling as the feeling of a run over dog. She is not really acquainted, however, with the feeling to which this phrase refers. Of course, the p0hrase is far from being complete nonsense to here; she is hardly speaking gibberish. What she says has an intelligible connotation, which she certainly understands. Moreover, she does know something about the quality of the feeling to which the phrase refers: she knows at least that it is an undesirable and unenjoyable feeling. The trouble with her statement is that it purports to convey something more than simply that she feels bad. Her characterization of her feeling is too specific; it is excessively particular. Hers is not just any bad feeling but, according to her account, the distinctive kind of bad feeling that a dog has when it is run over. To the Wittgenstein in Pascal's story, judging from his response, this is just bullshit."
            --Harry G. Frankfort, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 28-29.

Based upon this passage by Frankfort I hardly think it plausible to assume that the last post by Amos enjoys any plausibility or veracity whatsoever.