Onl half the story Bobad

"In 1937, the Palestinians were offered a state (Peel Commision), they said NO."
The Zionist leadership was bitterly divided over the plan.[4] In a resolution adopted at the 1937 Zionist Congress, the delegates rejected the specific partition plan. Yet the principle of partition is generally thought to have been "accepted" or "not rejected outright" by any major faction: the delegates empowered the leadership to pursue future negotiations.[4][7][8][9] The Jewish Agency Council later attached a request that a conference be convened to explore a peaceful settlement in terms of an undivided Palestine.[4] According to Benny Morris, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann saw it 'as a stepping stone to some further expansion and the eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine.'[10][4]

"In 1947, The Palestinians were offered a state (UN Partition), they said NO."
The Plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, despite its perceived limitations.[5][6] Arab leaders and governments rejected it[7] and indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division,[8] arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny.[6][9]

STOP BLAMING PALESTINE
Jim Carroll

"In 2000, the Palestinians were offered a state (Camp David), they said NO."
Public opinion towards the summit[edit]
The Palestinian public was supportive of Arafat's role in the negotiations. After the summit, Arafat's approval rating increased seven percentage points from 39 to 46%.[47] Overall, 68% of the Palestinian public thought Arafat's positions on a final agreement at Camp David were just right and 14% thought Arafat compromised too much while only 6% thought Arafat had not compromised enough.[47]
Barak did not fare as well in public opinion polls. Only 25% of the Israeli public thought his positions on Camp David were just right as opposed to 58% of the public that thought Barak compromised too much.[48] A majority of Israelis were opposed to Barak's position on every issue discussed at Camp David except for security.[49]
"In 2001, the Palestinians were offered a state (TABA), they said NO."
At the start of the Taba Summit, Israel held on three main points:[3]
no right of Palestinian refugees to return to inside the State of Israel
no Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
big settlement blocs (containing 80% of Jewish residents of the West Bank and Gaza) will be under Israeli sovereignty

In 2001, the Palestinians were offered a state (TABA), they said NO.
The breakdown is often attributed to the political circumstances posed by Israeli elections and changeover in leadership in the United States:[10] They had run out of political time. They couldn't conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office and Barak standing for reelection in two weeks. "We made progress, substantial progress. We are closer than ever to the possibility of striking a final deal," said Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel's negotiator. Saeb Erekat, Palestinian chief negotiator, said, "My heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."
Sharon Government's negation of the talks[edit]
The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 6 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.[11] Immediately after the elections and before the change of government, an 8 February 2001 statement published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clarified this evening that the ideas which were brought up in the course of the recent negotiations conducted with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, including those raised at the Camp David Summit and by President Clinton towards the end of his term in office, are not binding on the new government to be formed in Israel.

"In 2008, the Palestinians were offered a state (Olmert offer), they said NO."
Olmert's 2008 peace offer was a further improvement over previous proposals, yet Olmert refused to give Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas a copy of the Israeli map, which outlined the future borders of both states, unless Abbas first initialed it. Furthermore, Abbas was told by Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni not to accept the Olmert offer. The Palestinians planned on continuing negotiations after Olmert left office but were stuck with Benjamin Netanyahu, who, as Ross well knows, has been relentless in sabotaging negotiations, putting up roadblock after roadblock, or should I say settlement after settlement.

"In 2015, the Palestinians were offered a state (French sponsored UN offer), they said NO."
The initial Israeli reaction was that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would not discuss the eventuality of a peace conference unless France withdraws its ultimatum of recognizing Palestine as a state (in case the initiative is rejected). Furthermore, officials in the prime minister's office made it clear to the French that negotiations would have to be bilateral and unconditional. An international gathering without setting pre-conditions for negotiation could launch direct negotiations, as did the Madrid Conference of 1991 in which Netanyahu participated as deputy foreign minister.
The Palestinian position, as expressed to the French, is that the conference has to be based on the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, referring to the 1967 lines as future borders and to East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. Establishing the Arab initiative as the basis for a peace conference would also bring about the support of most of the Arab League member states for a Palestinian diplomatic move.
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT _ U.S. VETO
STOP BLAMING PALESTINE
Jim Carroll