Kevin,

I know that it is all fairly acedemic now but when you say:

"I strongly suspect that it may have been the fear that, under pressure, Saddam might actually start cooperating fully, which was a major reason for the urgency in getting the war under way."

I think that you are ignoring a couple of things.

1... It has only been the US and UK that have been applying the pressure that got inspectors back in in the first place and the only parties that applied the pressure that resulted in the few concessions the Iraqi regime made to assist that inspection programme.

2... Going back to last autumn and the US & UK requirement for a new resolution - This was vehemently opposed by both France and Russia at the time - the US & UK in their original draft wanted the "automaticity" (terrible word) that would convey the message to Saddam Hussein that unless the IAEA and UNMOVIC teams got full co-operation from day 1, military intervention would be used to enforce compliance. After a further eight weeks preparation time won for Saddam by UN inertia the new resolution (1441) arrived in such a form that allowed Saddam a good measure of leeway to continue his games of obfuscation and deceipt. Under the terms of 1441, Iraq was in material breach - from the UN there was absolutely no lead or desire to implement the serious consequences mentioned in that resolution - In this respect France was the main culprit - The message they passed to Saddam Hussein was that, you can just keep the game rolling, we will ensure that you will not be attacked. In that approach, the resolve of both the USA and the UK was seriously underestimated, with France, Russia and China threatening to use their veto powers to maintain Saddam in power, both the US and UK realised the diplomatic route had been brought to the end of the cul-de-sac. With 20 x 20 hindsight it would have been far better to allow the original draft resolution to go through - co-operation would have been complete from day 1.