Bobert - a reply to one of your earlier posts that I was unable to submit - you are clutching at straws and using your highly selective memory to do so:

"I notice that you have dropped your pre-invasion use of WMD and now when you use WMD there's the word "program" in close proximity. Ahhhh, did you come up with that yourself or are you perhaps parroting the Bush spin-masters? Ahhhh, nevermind. I know the answer to that one."

I know the answer to that one as well Bobert - the mention of WMD and WMD Programmes, with respect to Iraq have been around for about 12-13 years. The "programme" aspect that you, mistakenly, attribute to either myself, or the current US Administration has been detailed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and in instructions to IAEA, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspection teams - please feel free to check it out, then come back on this thread and tell me if that is correct - whether you will or not - ah well I think I know the answer to that one.

Amos, I could not disagree more:

1.
"The simple fact is that through incompetence or intent, the Resident put American soldiers in harm's way based on a false reality -- a reality that was intentionally falsified."

The reality was the contents of UNSCOM's Report of 1999, combined with a period of nearly four years during which no monitoring or inspections could be carried out. Evaluations of intelligence, at least as far as the UK government goes, provide best and worst case scenarios - unless there is an overwhelmingly good reason to do otherwise, it is always prudent to weight the evaluation towards the worst case - by following this path you are less likely to be caught out by nasty surprises.

Did Saddam Hussein have any WMD and were programmes in operation to develope such weapons? Time will tell, the items mentioned in the UNSCOM Report still have to be found, or evidence of there destruction has to be found. The war could have been avoided, had Saddam chosen to co-operate fully with UNMOVIC and IAEA from the outset. Why did he not do that? I can think of two possible explanations:

Pride:
Because it made the defeat of 1991 seem less complete. This was further bolstered by the fact that within 12 months of that war ending, the heads of government of the two most significant coalition allies (USA - George Bush Snr, and UK - John Major) had been removed from office, while Saddam remained in power.
The lack of co-operation and deception schemes used to thwart the efforts of UNSCOM inspection teams enabled Saddam and the Ba'athist regime to demonstrate to the other Arab nations in the region that Iraq could successfully defy the will of the international community. By his actions he demonstrated that he could continue to do so with increasing impunity.
As long as the regime in Iraq could convince the world, and its neighbours in the region particularly, that they still had a credible WMD capability Iraq would be considered as a power to be reckoned with.

The effects of co-operation and verifiable evidence of disarmament as required by the United Nations Security Council leads to the second of the possible reasons;

Security:
Dissidents within Iraq had to be made to believe that the regime in power still possessed this capability.
Iran had to be convinced that Iraq still possessed WMD and an ongoing WMD programme.

"The result of this mismanagement -- whether intentional or merely inept -- was several thousand Iraqi deaths, at least, including noncombatants in significant numbers, and a significant number of American and British deaths either by fire, accident or fratricide."

If any charge of mismanagement, or ineptitude, is to be levelled it should levelled fairly and squarely at the UN. My reasons for saying this are:
1. They dragged their collective heels with respect to outstanding resolutions pertaining to Iraq for years, adopting lethargic inaction as their preferred course.
2. After 911, a terrorist attack that Iraq had nothing to do with, but which Saddam Hussein publicly applauded, the US was forced to evaluate possible/probable locations and regimes from which a future attack on the United States could be launched or supported.
3. The US prompted the UN out of inaction and outlined what was required to put the verifiable disarmament of Iraq beyond doubt. This was vigorously resisted by France and Russia (Iraq's main trading partners) and by Germany.
4. The new resolution that both the US and UK insisted upon was weakened and delayed as much as possible by France, Russia and Germany but eventually arrived by unanimous vote as UNSC Resolution 1441. The US in the original draft wanted a specific threat of the use of military force should Iraq fail to comply with the requirements of the new resolution. Had that been allowed to stand - there would have been no war, because the message that would have sent to Saddam Hussein would have been clear and unmistakable – we, the international community, now mean business, comply or be removed from power. As it was, in its watered down version, Saddam saw room for manoeuvre and scope to continue his policy of prevarication and deception.

"He is either too slimy or too incompetent to retain his post and should be impeached."

On the contrary - he provided leadership when required, no matter how distasteful the task. As the man charged with the safeguarding the security of the United States of America and its citizens, he acted in a responsible manner - under no circumstances could he possibly have given Iraq's leader, or regime, the benefit of the doubt, that was simply not an option.