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War Strategy &Tactics: Part Two
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Subject: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 29 Sep 01 - 09:52 PM This is a continuation of the 122-post thread re US War Strategy, "key to"... There is evidence that the core of Afghanistanian radical fanatacism is losing its political control at the edges. From the UK press: Survivors who made it out of Taliban-controlled areas last week gave the first eyewitness details of how the country's rulers are turning on their own people in an attempt to terrify them into fighting and not supplying any succour or support to America, the enemy.
But the Taliban regime was looking increasingly fragile yesterday as large numbers of Afghans refused to obey their orders and, in some instances, came close to outright revolt.
In at least one province the Taliban authorities were forced to temporarily withdraw after local people challenged their rule. In Khost, a strategic city on the eastern border of Afghanistan and critical to any defence of the country, the Taliban governor was forced to leave after local tribesmen refused his orders to join defence militias. Elsewhere along the Pakistani frontier, local people in Paktia and Paktika provinces have told the Taliban that unless the Arab fighters associated with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group are withdrawn from their towns and villages they will refuse to obey any of the government's orders. About 50 Arab families have been evicted from their longstanding bases around the eastern city of Sorobi, according to refugees coming from Afghanistan. 'That's as close as you can get to an outright revolt without risking execution,' said one senior opposition leader in Peshawar last week. There have been similar scenes in Ghazni province - far closer to Kabul, the capital, and previously a Taliban stronghold. The Taliban have been forced to set up roadblocks to prevent Afghans fleeing major cities - in direct contravention of their orders. According to refugees, hundreds of people were yesterday being stopped at one checkpoint set up near Pul-e-Sharqi prison, a grim complex built by east Europeans on the road east of Kabul. Many of those fleeing are trying to escape the press gangs to which the hardline Islamic militia have resorted to fill the ranks of their army. Mullah Mohamed Omar, the reclusive one-eyed cleric who is the spiritual leader of the Taliban, was so concerned by the growing rebellion that he last week issued an unprecedented threat to any Afghans who disobey the Taliban's orders: they would be treated in the same way that collaborators with the Russians were treated during the Afghan war of resistance in the Eighties when suspects were tortured and staked out in the sunshine with their eyelids sliced off, or castrated and hung from trees. That's inspire them to see the truth, all right!! Hang 'em until they have an epiphany!! The beatings will continue until morale improves. Regards, A |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 29 Sep 01 - 09:53 PM Part one of this thread can be found over here. Regards, A. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: kendall Date: 29 Sep 01 - 09:55 PM If this keeps up those bastards are going to screw us out of a reason to blast them! (sarcasm intended) |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: GUEST Date: 30 Sep 01 - 10:02 AM I see we have more of the same from the Mudcat Theoretical & Rhetorical Politician Wannabees. How (in)apprpropriate. Please run for office and save the world and keep your opinions on a political forum. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: GUEST, A Member, being Anon. Date: 30 Sep 01 - 01:15 PM 'GUEST'....(*LOL*, as if anyone would actually invite someone like you...) I've said most of my serious points about you on the other threads youve trolled, so all that remains for me tosay here is... WHY??? ..surely you would get more of your juvenile fun by going in a 'real-time' chatroom, where you can actually see people reacting to your shit straight away? Alternatively, go back on medication, & remove the desire to waste your own time doing this? |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Little Hawk Date: 30 Sep 01 - 06:39 PM The generalised notion of a "war on evil" in the world is a fascinating concept...there is no doubt a target on every block and in every hamlet of every country on the planet. The most efficient way of waging such a war, however, would be to return each missile, bomb, and bullet fired directly onto the heads of those who gave the firing order (at the highest level, and thence on down to the fool with his finger on the trigger)...instant karma. It would only take a few days or possibly a few weeks of this to eliminate most of the really bloodthirsty and vengeful people on the planet, and then the rest of us could get back to normal, peaceful life and start cooperating to each other's mutual benefit. In fact, under such a system, you could arm violent people to the teeth, and they would handily destroy themselves toot sweet! Alas, we have not the means to put such a program into effect, short of an enormous all-encompassing act of God, and God (being the ultimate democrat...or, if you prefer...being non-existant) prefers to let us use our own free will and figure these things out in our own good time. For what is free will if not allowed to remain free? Thus is spiritual evolution served in its slow and quiet fashion. Not nearly fast enough for people as impatient as most of us are... I'd discuss tactics vis-a-vis subduing Afghanistan, but I'm not into rearranging deck chairs one more time on the Titanic at this point. - LH |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Gareth Date: 30 Sep 01 - 07:18 PM As Ive said before. A big enough "reward" for Ben Ladin's head (body optional) should do the trick. Gareth |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 30 Sep 01 - 08:13 PM Hey, LH. I keep remembering something I read a while back. Someone said, "You cannot alter their play, no matter how much you love them". But it's still feels good to hear about new possibilities. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 01 Oct 01 - 09:36 AM I think we can alter their play. Consider the remarkable changes in the "play" being pursued by Japan and by Germany. In both case the biggest resource at work was not the U.S. military, although that was essential to break the force-lock holding the drama in place. It was the underlying human decency of those who lived in these places and who had been swept up by a distorted and maddened minority. A |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 01 Oct 01 - 09:43 AM I'm encouraged that you think so, Amos. But the bit I was quoting referred to human beings in general. Not any particular group of human beings. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 01 Oct 01 - 02:01 PM "You cannot alter their play, no matter how much you love them". Carol, this line is obscure. What exactly does the word "play" mean in this context -- the act of playing (fun), a pre-written drama (stage), or looseness of a joint (mechanics), or something else? A. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 01 Oct 01 - 02:18 PM The quote I used was in the spirit of what Little Hawk said about free will. The meaning I get from the passage I quoted is that all of us have free will. And that we are responsible for what we do with our free will. So growth occurs when we see the results of our use of free will, and make corrections if we realize that the results of the choices we make are not what is best in the long run.
However, I think it is also saying that each individual has to make these realizations for him or herself, and that these realizations cannot be imposed upon an individual by an outside force or agency. I think the use of the word "play" in this context probably alludes to the idea that we are children of the universe, in the process of learning what reality is all about. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 03 Oct 01 - 12:33 AM An interesting perspective from an Indian woman who is an excelent writer and compassionate thinker: http://www.guardian.co.uk/saturday_review/story/0,3605,559756,00.html
The algebra of infinite justice
As the US prepares to wage a new kind of war, Arundhati Roy
Saturday September 29, 2001
In the aftermath of the unconscionable September 11 suicide attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre, an American newscaster said: "Good and evil rarely manifest themselves as clearly as they did last Tuesday. People who we don't know massacred people who we do. And they did so with contemptuous glee." Then he broke down and wept. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: DougR Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:09 AM Jeeze, L.H., seems to me you are preaching violence here! Send the bullets and missiles into the heads of those that gave the order, or pulled the trigger, or words to that effect! I never dreamed you would propose such a violent solution to the current problem ...and never, within my wildest imagiganition would have thought that Carol C, would condone your action. Tsk! Tsk! Tsk! Or maybe you really didn't mean it? :>) DougR |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:18 AM All for the sake of capitalism. Not for the sake of freedom. But I have hope, Amos. And this is why...
For the first time ever, the most powerful people of the world need the help of those whom they have disenfranchised for so long if they're going to accomplish their stated goal of goal of wiping out "evil" and terrorism in the world.
And I believe it will not be possible for these most powerful people to eliminate or even reduce the "evil" or terrorism committed by others without also eliminating their own reprehensible practices as well. I think this is the new paradigm under which we now operate, and maybe it's actually a little bit like what Little Hawk was describing above when he talked about "instant karma". |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:23 AM DougR, I think you misunderstood what LH was saying. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:54 AM *grin* DougR... "imagiganition"? ;-) |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 03 Oct 01 - 11:26 AM From the other end of the spectrum, a hard-nosed military mind offers these hard thoughts: CLASSMATES: Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs" -- even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country, and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively without too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject. I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite frankly, I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations. First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about our "enemy." Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live day-to-day,hand-to-mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing, that is, except for their pride. Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces; his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar. This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time, and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done). Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige. Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory. In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all involved. As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their history, the only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units. The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather, and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair generals: around November1st, most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who would not risk one life in face-to-face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually corrupt. Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles, and their lack of external support. More importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys. I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider very carefully putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper -- sorry to the females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women. I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing -- expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick up" the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country. While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange. During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the world-wide religious war that they desperately want. This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic. For anyone who is still reading this way too long note,thanks for your patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner. Thanks, Richard Kidd |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Paul from Hull Date: 03 Oct 01 - 11:49 AM Thanks for posting that Amos.... |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: M.Ted Date: 03 Oct 01 - 12:05 PM Another great article, Amos--please give us the source, if you can, and as much clarification as they have to clarify who wrote the pieces are--I save, re-post, and occasionally even refer to this stuff in conversation, and it is a bit awkward when you have no idea where what you are talking about came from-- |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: GUEST,Irish Sergeant Date: 03 Oct 01 - 12:45 PM Richard's points are most astute. Keep in mind three things: 1) Innocent civilians were killed in these attacks and no discrimination was shown by our foes. 2) This is going to be a long war and we will see casualities. 3) This war will not end until these evil bastards are brought to bay and I'm am not only talking about Bin Laden and company. Kindest reguards, neil |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: GUEST,petr Date: 03 Oct 01 - 12:51 PM this is an article from the Middle East Intelligence Bullettin. The US Can Collapse the Taliban by Michael Rubin Michael Rubin is a visiting scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. One week after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, world attention is focusing on reprisals against Afghanistan, whose Taliban regime has been sheltering not only Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida organization, but also a myriad of other terrorist groups. While the war against terrorism announced by President Bush earlier this month will almost certainly not stop at Afghanistan (Iran continues to shelter terrorist leaders like Imad Mughniyah, the mastermind of the 1983 car bomb attacks against the US embassy and marine barracks in Beirut, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Ahmad Sharifi, who was implicated in the planning stages of the 1996 bombing of an American military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia), the Taliban will most likely be the first target of any US military retaliation. Who exactly are the Taliban? The word taliban literally means religious students. The Taliban movement developed in the madaris (religious schools) of Pakistan in the early 1990s. Pakistan was a fertile ground for recruitment, home to perhaps two million Afghan refugees who fled Afghanistan's brutal civil war and idled in squalid refugee camps. With the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan in 1989, the common enemy disappeared. Former Mujahidin commanders turned on each other with a vengeance. Most of the mines waiting to be cleared are a result not of the Soviet occupation, but a result of indiscriminate scattering by rival warlords after the Soviet withdrawal. Rival factions shelled Kabul regularly. Vehicles traveling between the Pakistani border and Kabul had to traverse the territory of dozens of warlords; rapes, robberies, and murders became rampant. According to Doctors Without Borders, the civil war during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath cost 1.8 million lives. Given the war exhaustion and destruction of the 1980s and early 1990s, many in Afghanistan viewed the rise of the Taliban with quiet optimism. Afghans are traditional. Many welcomed the Taliban's vision of an Islamic state, at least until they saw what such a state would actually entail. The Taliban erupted onto the Afghan scene in November 1994, when they captured Kandahar. Through very little military action, but an aura of momentum and an ability to co-opt and accommodate various petty warlords, they expanded their territory, eventually capturing Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, and Afghanistan's last major city, Mazar-i Sharif, briefly in 1997, and then permanently in 1998. However, the Taliban were not able to conquer or co-opt Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic Tajik warlord, who set up a pocket of resistance in the Panjshir Valley, both along the Tajikistan border and within surface-to-surface missile range of Kabul (when I was in Kabul in March 2000, two missiles fired from Massoud's territory struck the city ). Massoud's pocket of resistance has been the only major vestige of the Northern Alliance still active inside Afghanistan. Massoud, "the Lion of the Panjshir," was the only Mujahidin commander who remained undefeated during the fight against Soviet occupation. One former intelligence official, personally familiar with Massoud, commented that he maintained a highly-trained corps of personal which he would distribute among the front "to stiffen" less trained troops. While Massoud was assassinated on September 10 (a report in the pan-Arabic daily Al-Hayat on September 11 suggested that bin Laden provided assistance in the killing), his forces are well-equipped to fight on. In contrast, many Taliban soldiers have little military training. While some argue that the Taliban and mercenary "Afghan Arabs" are really the product of Central Intelligence Agency operations in the 1980s, this is false. Many of the present Taliban were toddlers during the war against the Soviets. Some Arabs did come to Afghanistan during the 1980s, but many of these (including Bin Laden) became engaged in manual labor rather than combat against infidels. One US intelligence operative who worked in Afghanistan during the 1980s said that most of the Arabs coming to the country simply got in the way, and were viewed with disdain by the Mujahidin. In the current milieu, where battles can be decided by a few dozen troops, Bin Laden supplies assets valuable to the Taliban's fight against the Northern Alliance. Bin Laden's military brigade, which numbers perhaps only 700 (some estimate up to 2000), is the only force that is capable of both night fighting and balancing Massoud's forces. Many of the battles fought between the two sides are battles between the weak and depleted - numbering several hundred troops only. In the final analysis, the Taliban believe that they have gained more from bin Laden's presence and assistance than they have lost from remaining an international pariah. There are a number of training camps in Afghanistan to which Arabs who missed the jihad against the Soviets now flock. Rish Khor was one such camp, which stood on the outskirts of Kabul, though it was recently closed (or more likely, relocated to a spot less easily accessible to the prying eyes of foreigners). Two Western journalists told me of having their cameras smashed when they got too close to a training camp near Jalalabad, less than 50 miles from the Pakistani frontier. Moneychanger stalls in that city were awash in Saudi currency, and Arabs wearing kaffiyehs (traditional Arab head coverings) were in evidence in far greater numbers than one would expect from the few Middle Eastern aid organizations operating in the city. In August 1998, the US government struck at training camps outside the southeastern city of Khost after bin Laden's operatives attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Clearly, even if the Taliban shelter bin Laden for their own domestic reasons, his presence has become a threat not only to the United States, but to the international community. The success of the US retaliation against Afghanistan depends on the breadth of American objectives. Singling out bin Laden will likely be of little immediate success, as there are many potential hiding places in Afghanistan. However, the US could easily target the Taliban itself. Despite media commentary that portrays the movement as monolithic, they are anything but, so military action can provide stimulus for a factional implosion. I traveled through Afhganistan last year and was able to interview a number of Afghans, including members of the Taliban, regular civilians and foreign aid workers who had to work with the Taliban everyday to fulfill their respective humanitarian missions. These interviews indicated that the Taliban is quite divided, both politically and ethnically. Only about 10% of the Taliban members are uncompromising followers of Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of the group who claims to have received divine inspiration. An additional 30% might believe in Mullah Omar's interpretation of Islamic law, but believe that compromise must be made in its implementation. The rest, Afghans say, do not strongly support the regime, but have superficially pledged loyalty to it in order to keep their jobs. The Taliban are also ethnically divided. Most of the Taliban are ethnic Pushtun, and combine Mullah Omar's radical interpretation of Islam with the Pushtunwali, the Pushtun social code. The Taliban's treatment of women is rooted, for example, in the tradition of ethnic Pushtun villages, not just a narrow reading of the Quran. Most of northern and western Afghanistan, as well as the capital of Kabul, are Persian-speaking. People in the relatively cosmopolitan (by Afghan standards) capital tend to actively dislike Pushtuns, whom they see as illiterate peasants. The antipathy is mutual. The Taliban exacerbate enmity through arrogance. One woman was left destitute when a Taliban pick-up truck hit her husband; it did not bother to stop. In front of a former palace, I stopped to ask a Taliban for directions in Persian. He did not speak the language, screaming at me to get away in Urdu, the language of Pakistan (since I had grown a beard for five months, did not have a minder and spoke Persian, he presumably did not know I was an American). One older Afghan who saw him screaming told me not to feel bad, "they treat everyone like that." Many Afghans in Kabul and Ghazna, who initially welcomed the Taliban because of their promises of peace and tranquillity, told me that the Taliban's honeymoon was ending. The Taliban had failed to end the civil war, and the initial security was eroding. People across the country, but most movingly a Kabul gravedigger who perhaps knows better than anyone else, expressed no confidence that the war would end anytime soon. Regarding security, many Afghans talked about burglaries perpetrated by the Taliban. Last year, Taliban guards stole almost $200,000 from the Kabul's moneychanger bazaar, without any real consequence. In February 2000, there was an uprising in Khost (in the Taliban heartland, near where the US had struck with cruise missiles in August 1998) when the Taliban tried to appoint a governor who was not from the region. Likewise, an uprising later that year was narrowly averted in Jalalabad only when the Taliban fired an overbearing governor. Last year, an opposition commander set-up another pocket of resistance in the Nimruz province bordering Iran. CNN might repeatedly report that the Taliban control 90% of the country, but they have extreme difficulty keeping it under control. US missile strikes against the infrastructure of the Taliban government may be enough to cause its grip to unravel. Afghans are poor and weak, and need such a backdrop to break the monopoly of the Taliban. Such action would only be the beginning, but may serve as a warning to officials in Tehran, Damascus, and Gaza, who rhetorically condemn the attacks in New York and Washington, but, as with Baghdad and Kabul, continue to support and shelter groups or individuals engaged in terrorism. © 2001 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MEIB Main Page |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 03 Oct 01 - 12:51 PM M. Ted: I don't know the source -- it was forwarded to me as I have posted it -- but I suspect you could do a fruitful search on Richard Kidd, to whom it is attributed. Sorry I can't provide a sounder provenance. A. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:07 PM M. Ted: I put this on the wrong thread. The original seems to be from Xian science Monitor according to this page at The Nando Times. Regards, A |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: M.Ted Date: 03 Oct 01 - 01:42 PM The Richard Kidd piece apparently originated at http://www.g2mil.com/ which describes itself in this way: "G2mil is the only Warfare Research Portal on the Internet. If you are interested in military technology, weapons, tactics, future warfare, and military news, this website has hundreds of pages of unique content and links to hundreds of military related sites." It has a special section on the Afghan situation, including maps and information on the military history-- |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Jim the Bart Date: 03 Oct 01 - 02:10 PM Thanks for the information, folks. I have been following these discussions with great interest, although not actively participating. We are living in what could be a critical period of history; the actions of all paries over the term of the next years could determine everything to follow. After the last vacuous decades (at least in the states), we again live in interesting and important times. Contrary to the opinion of some short-sighted guests and members, I can't imagine a more relevant subject within a forum dedicated to the people's music. Stay well Bart |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 03 Oct 01 - 04:36 PM Hey Bart: I recall saying several times over the last decade, "Well, at least we live in interesting times". If I had a choice I would rather the randomness and volatility of my age come from an upwelling of adventure, new technologies, breakthroughs in song, art and science, and the great thrills of the business world than that they come from mass assaults against my species. Not like I have a choice! :>) A |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 03 Oct 01 - 08:30 PM It's good that there are people who are so well versed in the dynamics and psychology of the Taliban as well as the people of Afghanistan. However, our stated intention is not war with the Taliban. That could become an issue, but our stated intention is to fight a war on "terrorism". In order to fight and succeed in such a war, it will be self defeating if we focus on how things work in Afghanistan to the exclusion of all else. It is necessary to fit what we know about Afghanistan and the Taliban into a much larger, very complicated jigsaw puzzle of nations, peoples, and religious and political ideologies. We have to examine everything we do with regards to Afghanistan and the Taliban in relation to how our actions effect the larger picture. If we don't, we run the risk of becoming mired down in a conflict with a very large portion of the world's population. So it's good that we have people like the ones who have been quoted above from whom we can get good information. But that information must be placed into the larger context, and understood and acted upon from that perspective if we are to accomplish our objective. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: heric Date: 03 Oct 01 - 09:22 PM Oh, yes, CarolC: http://www.thisislondon.com/dynamic/news/story.html?in_review_id=462228&in_review_text_id=414574 |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 03 Oct 01 - 10:01 PM Wow, I,hurricane. Thanks for the link. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: heric Date: 04 Oct 01 - 12:16 AM CarolC you can call me Dan. Nobody else can. Well, Nobody can. (That was a little name joke there.) I promised in another thread to stop posting so much. So I will. UNTIL THE BOMBS START DROPPING. Then I'm sure I'll be needing your thoughts CarolC. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 04 Oct 01 - 04:11 AM Thanks Dan. Let's keep our fingers crossed that the bombs don't start dropping, and that if they do, I'll still have a thought or two left. ;-) |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: DougR Date: 04 Oct 01 - 07:02 PM One country at at time, CarolC. Amos: Thanks for posting that excellent piece. One of the best I've seen. CarolC; in reply to L.H. above I had tongue firmly planted in cheek. :>) DougR |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 04 Oct 01 - 07:15 PM DougR, I don't think we're in a postition to make that determination. I think each country involved will make that decision for themself. If we screw up and they all decide to respond at the same time, I don't really think there will be anything we can do about it. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: DougR Date: 04 Oct 01 - 08:16 PM Except for one thing, CarolC: the United States is leading the show. This is not an effort where muliple countries are acting independently ...at least not from what I hear and read. DougR |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Amos Date: 04 Oct 01 - 08:48 PM From a letter to a retired US AID Education director: As an expert in women's education, I think you ought to rough out a campaign to start a women's movement amongst the mothers, sisters, and wives of Islam. Once the first round of public executions dies out it would be "The Trojan Women" all over again, and terrorism would no longer be a viable option for any young stud who thought himself a warrior. Eventually, given the grassroots fire of a truly spontaneous women's movement, the coupling of secular and religious would just die a natural death and they could get on with building a viable economy. The power held by groups like the Taliban would migrate over to the wombs of Islam, where it belongs. Whaddya say?? Never mind those SOF guys. We should get a couple of battalions of Martha Stewart Grenadines!! (Those are feminist Grenadiers, right?) I'm telling you, folks -- following the money will only get you half-way there. But if you follow the sausage it'll take you all the way to the hearth, where something effective can be done. "With a tow-row-tow-row-tow-row for Ms Stewart's Gren-aaaa-diiiiiines!" A |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Little Hawk Date: 04 Oct 01 - 10:07 PM Amos - I read that article by the Indian author, Arundhati Roy, and I'd say it's about the most realistic analysis of the situation I've seen yet. "American people ought to know that it is not them but their government's policies that are so hated" (in much of the third world population) And it is not their democratic freedoms that draw attack upon them, but the lack of those freedoms and the lack of even a decent level of existence in the third world that do so. Terrorism is driven by feelings of despair and inequality and powerlessness. Those who cannot afford to arm and maintain effective conventional forces capable of fighting a superpower or a regional power will resort to cheaper and more covert methods of attack...as the Irish did again and again against the British Empire...as the Palestinians do against Israel...or pick any number of other examples throughout world history. Only one thing can end these struggles...and that one thing is NOT "victory". (Victory is temporary, and is the conceit of the short-sighted.) That one thing is equality. If you treat people in the world with equality, then you end their despair. Equality means starting all people off with a reasonably equal chance in life no matter where or among whom they happen to have been born. That involves food, housing, education, transportation, medicine, trade, political and social freedoms...the whole ball of wax. No one has even attempted to do that yet on a worldwide scale, because our world is still functioning kind of like the Wild West did, the USA being the biggest "ranch" at the moment, with the most guns. It would require a completely different economic and political theory than our present dominant ones in order to do so. (i.e. to do things in order to achieve the best social result for all people concerned, rather than in order to make the biggest short term profit for a few who are already doing very well indeed...at the expense of the rest). We are still, in fact, living by survival of the fittest (meaning...the richest and most well armed nations and individuals). That is a gangster/robber baron philosophy. It's a philosophy worthy of animals in nature (who are innocent), but not worthy of human beings (who know too much to be innocent). Genuine spiritual communities are marked by the fact that all members share equally on a material level. Our whole world population ought to attempt to do the same. But that is a concept so large and so revolutionary that our leaders have not had either the will or the guts to take it on yet, although they might pretend they believe in equality when they make speeches. They don't. They believe in victory. They intend to achieve peace through force and through fear, rather than to achieve equality through sharing. And most of their citizenry will back them up on that. Gandhi believed in equality, and he got shot by one who believed merely in victory. Had more opened their hearts and listened to what Gandhi was offering them, India would not have been partitioned, and a great many lives would have been saved. Equality is always possible, but it's not easy. It takes greater courage than war and far greater powers of vision. - LH |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 04 Oct 01 - 10:26 PM DougR, the US has no control over the other nations of the world. Either we have their cooperation, or we don't. If we piss off enough countries, we could find ourselves dealing with a lot more enemies than we have right now. And goodness knows, we need their friendship more than we need their enmity.
I don't think we make or maintain friendships with other nations by acting like we think we own them, or even that we control them. We can only accomplish what we want to do with the cooperation of all concerned. And the attacks on 11 Sept. have shown that we do not control our enemies. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Troll Date: 04 Oct 01 - 10:27 PM Everyone talks about Ghandi as if he were some sort of God. Ghandi was a very shrewd politician who knew his enemy (the British) better than they knew themselves. He knew that they could not bring themselves to shoot unarmed men, women and children and so his campaign of civil disobedience won out in the end. Had he been facing say, the Germany of the 1930's, he would have been dead with most of his followers the first time they held a demonstration. Is was not his social theories that won the day. It was a profound knowledge of his opponents strengths and weaknesses. troll |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: harpgirl Date: 04 Oct 01 - 10:50 PM There's only one way to win the war. Stop me if you've heard this. Capture Osama Bin Laden and give him a sex change operation and make him live as a woman under the regime of the Taliban!!! FREE AGHANI WOMEN!! |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: DougR Date: 04 Oct 01 - 10:56 PM Hmmm. Harpgirl, I just got an email from k.c. recommending the same thing. Must be a good idea! CarolC: Who is putting together the coilition? Have you heard of any country's dissatisfaction with the way it is being organized? With U. S. leadership? I haven't. DougR |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Little Hawk Date: 04 Oct 01 - 11:01 PM Good points, Troll. Gandhi himself admitted that his methods would not have worked against the Nazis. Nevertheless, he did have his eyes on a higher ideal than is usually common, and he faced great personal risk many times in pursuing it. He was willing to treat all members of all religious faiths in a completely equal and respectful fashion, in a society where that was hardly the norm at the time (or still now). This doesn't make him a god, but it does make him an extraordinary human being...and, as you say, an astute politician. The thing about most people is...they are willing to look the other way as long as their own bed is comfortable. They live in denial most of the time. Gandhi didn't do that. Thus he is remembered as a liberator of his people. Not a god, but a great soul, which is what "mahatma" means. - LH |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 04 Oct 01 - 11:32 PM DougR, every country that is involved in the coalition has concerns that they share with us, and also concerns that are not the same as ours. Some nations may even have concerns that are unique to those nations.
The coalition can be strong if the needs and concerns of all of the members carry equal weight. But it will be weak if some nations' concerns carry more weight than others.
As far as the way in which the coalition is being shepherded, I certainly don't have all of the details, and I doubt that you do either. However, I have heard leaders of some nations express concerns about the consequences of some actions that have, at various points in the past, been brought up as possibilities. If we act without taking these concerns into consideration, we could force countries who would like to help us into the difficult position of having to deny us help.
And in a worst case scenario, a country could be so severely destabilized that a government that is friendly to us now could be replaced by one that is not. It is time for us to fit into the word picture as the equal of all other nations, not as their superior officer. The old paradigm of the US being superior to the rest of the world went the way of the dinosaurs on 11 Sept.
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Troll Date: 04 Oct 01 - 11:47 PM Thanks LH. He was quite a man. troll |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Donuel Date: 05 Oct 01 - 12:07 AM Ghandi was one of the 10 most influential people in the 20th century. Too bad he was shot to death by an Islamic fundamentalist. |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: DougR Date: 05 Oct 01 - 12:18 AM CarolC: If you are now aware that the U. S. is taking the leadership position in this effort, you simply aren't reading the same things I am, or watching the same current news that I'm watching on television (which certainly may be the case). Of course the countries involved in the coalition have their own individual problems, and they should be addressed equally with ours, but the war is against terriorism world-wide, not only as it affects the U. S. If Osama Bin Laden has been identified as the one responsible for the September 11 event, in would seem only natural to me that they would go after him first. Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakastan and many other allies are satisfied the there is ample evidence that he is the guy to go after. I really don't believe any other country is equipped to take the leadership position and I haven't heard any world leaders questioning it. That doesn't mean that the U.S. is superior, it just means we are better equipped to do the job. DougR |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 05 Oct 01 - 12:18 AM It's possible that I was given bad information about this, but someone told me that Ghandi was not in favor of equality between Hindus and Muslims in India, and that he actively worked against it. Has anyone else heard anything about that? |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: CarolC Date: 05 Oct 01 - 12:24 AM Well, DougR, I guess I don't really know what you are debating with me about. In one of your previous posts you said, "One country at at time, CarolC." And that is what I was responding to originally. This discussion seems to have somehow wandered away from that original statement, and become about something entirely else. Perhaps, for the sake of clarity, I should ask you exactly what you meant by that statement.
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Troll Date: 05 Oct 01 - 01:40 AM Don, I could be wrong but I think he was killed by a hindu. troll |
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Subject: RE: War Strategy&Tactics: Part Two From: Troll Date: 05 Oct 01 - 01:47 AM CarolC, this should answer your question too. On Jan.30, 1948 Mahatma Ghandi, the non-violent leader, was killed by a Hindu man upset about Ghandi's efforts to reconcile Hindus and Muslims after India won independence from Britian in 1947. Mahatma Ghandi used non-violent, peaceful protest and demonstations to win India's independence from years of British rule. I just pulled this of the web. Quick search "death of Ghandi". troll |
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