BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: dianavan
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 04:57 AM

"In the buildup to the war, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis were cooperating with U.N. inspections, and in February 2003 had provided Blix's team with the names of hundreds of scientists to interview, individuals Saddam claimed had been involved in the destruction of banned weapons. Had the inspections been allowed to continue, Blix said, there would likely be a very different situation in Iraq today. As it was, America's pre-emptive, unilateral actions "have bred more terrorism there and elsewhere."

http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_blix.shtml

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: beardedbruce
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 09:58 AM

LH,

OK, no problem.

"I cannot fault Saddam for rebuilding his military after the Gulf War. Anyone else in his position would have tried to do the same. His country was being bombed off and on ever since the Gulf War, and was not even allowed to use 2/3 of its own air space...which was given over instead to enemy aircraft which were bombing him whenever they wanted to! What would you do if someone did that to the USA for ten years? Would you NOT attempt to fight back? Would you NOT attempt to restore your military to full strength?"

OK, by the standard YOU have stated, if the Confederacy, after surrendering, had decided to rebuild its military and retake its territory, you would approve?

Can't you consider the KKK to be the gorilla forces of the CSA, and thus you would support their activities from 1865 through the present?

SADDAM LOST IN KUWAIT. He agreed to certain TERMS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE- his violations OF THOSE TERMS SEEM TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 10:51 AM

Sigh... BRuce, I think you are altering LH's intent, in a frenzy.


A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Little Hawk
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 11:07 AM

That's it, BB! You have insulted all gorillas (and by extension, all other primates) by your inflammatory statement, and I quote:

"Can't you consider the KKK to be the gorilla forces of the CSA, and thus you would support their activities from 1865 through the present?"

OUTRAGEOUS! On behalf of offended gorillas everywhere, I refuse to dignify that absurd question with an answer. (and I am now stalking away, deeply offended)

(snort!)

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: beardedbruce
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 11:09 AM

LH,

You do not address the issue. Please explain why your comments re Iraq would not equally apply to the CSA?

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Little Hawk
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 11:37 AM

Sorry. I just could not resist the joke. ;-)

Okay, here's how I see that. Iraq is not comparable to the CSA, because it's a complete other country from the USA, it's very far away, speaking a different language, whole different culture...whereas the Confederacy was one half of one original English-speaking American society that split apart in a civil war.

It think its just silly to compare Iraq to the CSA. You have to be Mr Fantastic (from the Fantastic Four) to stretch a point that far.

Regarding Saddam's violation of terms for the ceasefire: tell me, what, specifically, were his violations? Can you list them? And do you regard them as really having anything to do with Mr Bush's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 or were they just a handy technical excuse to?

I would think the latter. Petty legal excuses are almost always cited by aggressors who wish to attack someone, but want to make it look like they have a legitimate reason to.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: GUEST,petr
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 11:38 AM

well America claims the right to defend itself, so then
Nicaragua has the right to react militarily after the US mined its harbors.

Of course Nicaragua didnt do so, they tried to take it to the world court but then the US doesnt recognize it (although they like to use UN resolutions when it suits them, and complain about Saddam not COMPLYING with the rules)..

all theyve done is to spur those (that can), to increase their development of nuclear weapons. Ie. the states that disobey the Godfather. Such as Iran, and NK. to add to nuclear proliferation

QUite the opposite of their intended plan of maintaining pax americana through military strength - the US elites have actually cost AMerica much of its respect and prestige and made it look quite impotent.
as well as incompetent..

After all youd have thought that an invasion by the worlds most powerful military on a weak demoralized 3rd world nation with a broken down infrastructure, should have been one of the easiest in history.
(Rumsfeld thought it would be 6 days, maybe 6 weeks, and doubted 6 months...)

as a result they ended up with a more powerful Iran (which got rid of an enemy and gained much influence in Iraq)
They got a North Korea which under a new deal now gets to keep whatever nukes its developed..

South America, the back yard aint what it used to be..

theyve also spent trillions of the nations wealth..
in 20years as Goldman Sachs predicts Chinas economy will eclipse the US. (probably by then we wont be trading oil in US $ either)

and when it comes to empire, the economy (stupid!) trumps all.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Wolfgang
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 01:52 PM

Little Hawk is an Orillero, so he knows about the difference between Tortilleros, Toreros, Gorilleros and Guerilleros.

Wolfgang (who has no gorillerotic inclinations)

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 22 Mar 07 - 02:56 PM

Nothing odd about Wolfgang. Now, female orangutangs... well, that is another story.


A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Teribus
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 11:07 AM

Amos - 21 Mar 07 - 09:52 AM

"We're in Iraq at the invitation of their Government? Meaning if they asked us to leave we would?"

Yes Amos, exactly that, not opinion that is what has been clearly stated by all parties all along, that is what is stated as a condition in the UN Mandate Resolution.

Other things that you and your fellow travellers have also doubted:

- The creation of the CPA and how long it would last

- The hand-over to an Interim Government made up of Iraqi's and how long that would last.

- The drafting of a new constitution for Iraq by the interim government

- The hand-over from the Iraqi interim government to a democratically elected Iraqi Government.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: GUEST,petr
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 11:31 AM

you should read an article by George Packer in this weeks Nyorker.
Its about how the iraqi interpreters who have worked for the Americans have been treated for the past 4 years. It may only be up for a few days. But what a surprise that the Americans in their arrogance have cared little for the opinions and treatment of their best allies in Iraq, no wonder they've lost.



here

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 12:08 PM

I'm sorry, T, but I doubt we would comply if we did not at the same time wish to leave for our own reasons.

This is just opinion. Obviously you have more faith in this administration than I do, or for that matter, 65% of the nation put together.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: George Papavgeris
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 12:30 PM

At last, the truth is out.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Little Hawk
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 02:49 PM

Ho! Ho! Nice satire.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: dianavan
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 04:04 PM

Good article, petr. Its hard to believe that the U.S. claims to be helping the Iraqis when, in fact, they don't seem to like them or trust them.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Bobert
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 08:05 PM

bb,

Why have you gone back to SCREAMING at people???

Kinda reminds me of a few years back and I knew this guy who had a landscaping firm and had hired several Hispanis workers and thought that rather than learn a little Espanol he'd just SCREAM in English to them???

Didn't work with him and it ain't workin' with you either...

SCREAMING is rude, rude, rude... And guess what??? Yeah I'm sure this is going to come as a major surprise to ya, pal, but there are lots of folks who absolutely will nopt read anything posted by a SCREAMER...

Get it yet???

You are smart 'nuff feller to noe have to resort to rude behavior...

Bobert

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: GUEST,beardedbruce
Date: 23 Mar 07 - 09:42 PM

bobert

after one has repeated something enough times, and never been understood, one grasps at straws- perhaps these people can't read anything but upper case?

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Ron Davies
Date: 24 Mar 07 - 09:28 PM

Refresh--as George says, the truth is out--and it must be heard.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Don Firth
Date: 24 Mar 07 - 10:27 PM

Understood, BB. But not buying it.

Don Firth

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Bobert
Date: 25 Mar 07 - 09:41 PM

Ditto, Don...

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 04 Apr 07 - 10:24 AM

Thew New York Times offers an article from a member of the Iraq study group on this page which lists out major milestones toward self-sufficiency in Iraq that have been missed.

I had an interesting discussion with a recently returned Iranian-born US citizen who went home to visit. He said that visiting in Tehran was a good reality check on how glad he is to be in the States, and he thinks all American youth should spend six months in a third-world country to get some kind of reality on what it could be like.

Reflecting on some of his remarks, I am of the opinion that the whole strategy of conquest in Iraq is misconceived because the administration, in their haste to evict Hussein, never analyzed what he was doing that succeeded in making Iraq a largely secular state.

Saddam was keeping Iraq secular in its public affairs by suppressing religious issues. Although the antecedents of the divide between Sunis and Shia go back to the 4th century, the issue that divides the Muslim universe is not the doctrine of the Shia or the doctrine of the Shiite; it is the doctrine, and the power, of their clerics.

The clerics define the teachings of the Koran as suits their interests. They often prohibit their flocks from studying the book itself, by insisting it is so holy it cannot be handled except with appropriate ablutions and formalities -- not conducive to study. Literacy is not universal anyway. So the infusion of the Koran;s teachings is done orally, through the medium of the clerics, and they have their own opinions about what should be taught. While the Koran itself originally abjures violence, much as the teachings of Christ do, these teachings are dramatically modified by the clerics to make the lessons support political divisions against Jews and Christians, against the United States, and against other Msulims who belong to the wrong club. Additionally, the Koran is provided often only in ancient classic Arabic, which is a bit like learning the Bible from a version written in Chucerian. There was no King James.

It is this disconnection from their own sources which brings about the persistence of the division; left to their own devices, the two sects usually live tolerantly with each other and sometimes intermarry.

If the United States were to invest a fraction of its war chest into revitalizing the true messages of the Koran, by, for example, providing millions of paperback copies faithfully translated into modern Arabic, or millions of leaflets emphasizing certain sectors as used to be done by Christian sects in this country, it wouldbring about a revival of genuine Muslimism and disempower the clerics whose authority depends on the inability of the masses to see the original material.

It will not work to seek to force the people of Iraq to live in brotherhood under one government, by showing them the force of arms and conquest. That ain't how brotherhood works. Giving them a Koran they could read for themselves would be a powerful remedy to this paradox, although it would piss of the mullahs dramatically.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: George Papavgeris
Date: 04 Apr 07 - 10:35 AM

An excellent point, Amos.
A couple of hours ago I was listening to the radio, and some journo was spouting forth about how Gideons Bibles should be banned from hotel rooms because (she thought) they "limit freedom of choice". Her opponent simply said "well, how about adding a copy of the Coran in English as well, then?" - she was stumped. Having read your post, I now think there are at least two excellent reasons why the Gideon organisation should actually publich and distribute such a version of the Coran, if nobody else will.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: dianavan
Date: 04 Apr 07 - 06:43 PM

What a great idea!

Yes, the Mullahs are a bit like the Catholic priests who tell their parishoners how to vote or the Benedictines that believe that only they have the authority to interpret the Bible. Remember the Cathars? They were Christians who were called heretics and killed. Remember the Inquisitions? Christianity went through that stage but it was only when people began to read and interpret the Bible on their own, that they began the journey to freedom - when church and State were separated. Remember Martin Luther?

Again, it looks like it gets down to education. Before anyone can actually read and understand the Koran, they have to be able to read it in their own language. Wouldn't it be great if the Koran were distributed in many languages, free of charge? At least it would be a start. Most educated Muslims, however, do read and interpret the Koran on their own. Its the illiterate who depend on the Mullahs.

Yes, the Mullahs are a bit like the Vatican. Can you imagine if the Vatican ruled the western world today? Wait a minute! Do they? Lets consider stem cell research, abortion and what constitutes sin or how you get to heaven. They still have alot of power and they also have alot of property and money. I think the Vatican and the Mullahs are actually a pretty good comparison.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Donuel
Date: 04 Apr 07 - 08:16 PM

The Vatican has no overt power to rule anything. They do influence political movements as easily as lending no support to the liberal priests in South America. The dictatorships kill the liberal nuns and priests and life goes on. John Paul clearly influenced Solidarity in Poland but claiming he defeated the Soviet Union is just plain wrong.

dianavan, while stem cells got all the press, I believe the nanobiological sciences have grown to immense proportions and will deliver suffering in the form of nano pollution to a community or friend near you.

The current escaped nano threat is not life threatening but it is painful itchy and ugly. There has been no comment by the Vatican or ethicists with a natinal voice that I have heard regarding nano technology becoming combined with biology.

Beyond the claim that nanobots will eat our garbage and pollutants there has almost no public overview of the problems nanotech has already caused.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: GUEST,Peter Woodruff
Date: 04 Apr 07 - 09:05 PM

911 would never have happened if the "men behind the bushes" didn't want to steal the oil fields in Iraq.

Peter

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 05 Apr 07 - 10:41 AM

ANother interesting tragedy in the hostory of Iraq is encapsulated in this Reuters article describing the dangers of being a professor in a country where students are willing to issue death threats if they don't get the grades they want, regardless of merit. "High grades or death" is of course a very stupid proposition, but if the brains of the nation are forced to flee to Jordan or further afield in a quest for some kind of sanity, the long-term consequences will be more mullahs and not enough competence to build a middle class, asthmatic markets and limping capital, with consequent poverty and suppressed growth potential.

Try explaining that to an eighteen=year-old with misunderstoods about calculus and a Kalashnikov.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 12 Apr 07 - 09:57 AM

Tragedy in an administrative mask: here is a partial list of civilian claims for deaths and losses caused by US troops in Iraq. Many of these are accidental by-products of combat. Many more of them are accidents. Some of them, if true, are tales of murder, little My-Lais whose truth will never be known.

These heartbreaking stories sit squarely on the plate of the Bush gang, IMHO -- they are predictable fruits of war.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 12 Apr 07 - 01:22 PM

Lessons of the past about war, as taught by the poets who lived in it, with it, in spite of it: Poems about War.

If Rove, or Rumsfield, Or Wolfowitz or W had understood one tenth of these lines, they would have had a different idea indeed about playing Caesar in the fields of Mesopotamia.


A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: beardedbruce
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 09:23 AM

Washington Post:

Will Iraq Be the Next Rwanda?

By Stuart Gottlieb
Sunday, April 15, 2007; Page B07

Remember Rwanda? The history books have not treated kindly America's inaction while more than 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered by their Hutu compatriots in the spring of 1994 after a plane crash killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi.

Now consider a scenario in which the decisions and actions of the United States were the primary reasons for a country's descent into chaos and sectarian violence, yet instead of doing everything possible to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, America chose to walk away. What would the history books say about that?

Should the Democratic leadership in Congress succeed in forcing the hasty withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, we may well find out.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid point to escalating sectarian violence between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis as the primary justification for pulling out U.S. troops. In a joint letter to President Bush last month urging him not to veto legislation that includes timelines for withdrawal, Pelosi and Reid said that they have come to the "inescapable conclusion that U.S. forces should not be trying to contain an Iraqi civil war" and that "a phased redeployment of U.S. forces should commence."

Democrats try to soften this message by arguing that a date certain for withdrawal will force Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to, as Pelosi and Reid put it in a January statement, "find the political resolution required to stabilize Iraq."

But these arguments are as falsely optimistic as the White House's claim four years ago that our troops would be greeted as liberators. According to the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, "A premature American departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of conditions." And the National Intelligence Estimate released in January warned that rapid U.S. withdrawal would probably lead to the collapse of Iraqi security forces, along with "massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement."

Americans are understandably frustrated with the administration's mismanagement of this war. And stabilizing Iraq has proved to be a tremendous challenge. But Democrats elected in November on promises to end the war need to be careful.

History will note that the same Democrats who supported America's interventions to help end civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s now favor a withdrawal policy in Iraq that is likely to cause even greater human suffering. While the toll in Iraq has been tremendous -- at least 75,000 civilians have been killed since the war began in March 2003, the Brookings Institution estimates -- this number could increase tenfold or more should all-out civil war emerge. Such a development would signal the death knell of the main Democratic foreign policy legacy of the 1990s: the principle of "no more Rwandas."

History will also note that while primary blame lies with the White House, in October 2002 overwhelming, bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate voted to authorize this war. That there is a growing consensus in both parties that the war was a mistake does not free the United States from its responsibility for creating the power vacuum in Iraq. Withdrawal in the face of a nearly certain humanitarian catastrophe would leave a black mark on America's reputation and diminish its role in the world for generations.

Those calling for swift withdrawal say that the war has lasted too long and taken too great a toll in American blood and treasure. But these considerations must be weighed against all our interests in the region.

Beyond the humanitarian reasons to find a viable exit strategy, vital strategic concerns include preventing a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, an al-Qaeda safe haven in western Iraq and oil prices that top $100 per barrel.

Does this mean the United States should endure endless sacrifice for what may be a lost cause? Of course not. But Democrats should not oversimplify the prospects of painless withdrawal the way the White House once exaggerated the prospects of easy victory. The stakes, both moral and strategic, are simply too high.

This moment calls for congressional leadership that is united toward bringing stability to Iraq. At a minimum, the president's new counterinsurgency strategy needs to be given every opportunity to succeed, if only to permit a more deliberative discussion of all withdrawal options.

In 1998, President Bill Clinton apologized to the people of Rwanda for America's failure to help stem the killing that occurred on his watch.

Should Iraq descend into all-out civil war, there will be far more to apologize for in the decades to come.

The writer, a Democratic foreign policy adviser and speechwriter in the Senate from 1999 to 2003, directs the policy studies program at Yale University.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Barry Finn
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 09:29 AM

Remember Rwanda
Remember the Alamo
Remember the Maine

All tripe to either drum up passions to go to war or stay at war.

Barry

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: beardedbruce
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 09:32 AM

Remember Cambodia

Remember Bosnia

Remember Dachau

Remember Armenia


Obviously, you consider genocide to be tripe.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 09:45 AM

"....SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U)

It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks. (U)

We shall work closely with friendly governments in carrying out our counterterrorism policy and will support Allied and friendly governments in combating terrorist threats against them. (U)

Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions. (U) ..."

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm


Bill Clinton 1998 :
"The community of nations may see more and more of the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow."

Al Gore 2002:
"Iraq does pose a serious threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf and we should organize an international coalition to eliminate his access to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to completely deter and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power."

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 09:53 AM

Clinton Letter on Weapons of Mass DestructionThe White House
Office of the Press Secretary
By President Clinton, November 12, 1998

Dear Mr. Speaker:

On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction" -- WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Indeed, on July 28, 1998, I issued Executive Order 13094 to strengthen Executive Order 12938 by, inter alia, broadening the types of proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. I am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended, and have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.

On July 28, 1998, I amended section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities. The amendment to section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that subjects entities to potential penalties under the Executive order. The original Executive order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive order to include attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of United States Government assistance to foreign persons, as well as the prohibition of United States Government procurement and imports into the United States.

The following report, which covers activities on or before October 31, 1998, is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation concerns and nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the "CBW Report."

Nuclear Weapons

In May, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests. In response, I imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by the Glenn Amendment. Beyond our unilateral response, world reaction was pronounced and included nearly universal condemnation across a broad range of international fora and a broad range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by international financial institutions unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-8 and other countries.

Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United Nations to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join multilateral arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms race and build confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions. The United States has over the past 5 months focused most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, and engagement in productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); restraint in deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.

Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan, U.S. high-level dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials has yielded some progress. Both governments, having already declared testing moratoria, indicated publicly that they are prepared to adhere to the CTBT under certain conditions. Both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament session. They have also pledged to institute strict control of sensitive exports that meet internationally accepted standards. In addition, they have resumed bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level.

In recognition of these positive steps and to encourage further progress, I decided on November 3 to exercise my authority under the Brownback provision of the 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277) to waive some of the Glenn sanctions. Through this action, I have authorized the resumption of Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and International Military Education and Training programs in India and Pakistan and have lifted restrictions on U.S. banks in these countries. We will continue discussions with both governments at the senior and expert levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5 and in international fora.

So far, 150 countries have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT. During 1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the Treaty.

On September 23, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 1998 Plenary in Edinburgh, Scotland, March 30 to April 2, on the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. With 35 member states, the NSG is a mature, effective, and widely accepted export-control arrangement. Over the past 7 years the NSG has established a Dual-Use Regime (DUR), agreed to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply, created an effective Joint Information Exchange, and strengthened controls over technology and retransfers. The NSG is considering further activities to promote regime transparency, following the success of the 1997 Vienna transparency seminar, and is preparing for a transparency seminar in New York during the run-up to the 1999 NPT PrepCom.

The NSG is considering membership for Belarus, China, Cyprus, Kazakhstan and Turkey. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a member of the NSG, although China did join the Zangger Committee last year and recently has expressed an interest in learning more about the NSG.

The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee has demonstrated its continued relevance to the multilateral nonproliferation regime as the interpreter of Article III-2 of the NPT by the membership of China in October 1997 by recently agreeing to a statement deploring the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. This is the first time the Zangger Committee has ever issued a statement not directly related to publication of its Guidelines. Furthermore, the Zangger Committee is considering a U.S. proposal to add conversion technology to the Trigger List.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce in order to control the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on April 25. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 5, 1997. As of October 31, 1998, 120 countries (including Iran, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.

The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at the entry into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for implementing the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections, and serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).

The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the United States) and acts as the governing body for the OPCW between annual meetings of the Conference of the States Parties. Since EIF, the EC has met numerous times to address issues such as scale of assessments, CW production facility conversion requests, facility and transitional verification arrangements, and staff regulations.

The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 300 inspections in some 20 countries. It conducted nearly 100 such inspections in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.

The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted into law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). Accordingly, we anticipate rapid promulgation of implementing regulations on submission of U.S. industrial declarations to the OPCW. Submission of these declarations will bring the United States into full compliance with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has, among other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely declarations.

Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and prohibited under the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons. We anticipate rapid promulgation of U.S. regulations implementing these CWC trade restrictions.

The United States also continues to play a leading role in the international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of national views and clarification of existing text. We held four AHG negotiating sessions in 1998, and five are scheduled for 1999.

On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I announced that the United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect and deter cheating. The United States will work closely with U.S. industry to develop U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach international agreement on: declarations, nonchallenge clarifying visits, and challenge investigations. Other key issues to be resolved in the Ad Hoc Group in 1999 are details on mandatory declarations, placement of definitions related to declarations, and questions related to assistance and export controls.

On the margins of the 1998 U.N. General Assembly, senior United States Government representatives attended a Ministerial meeting hosted by the Government of New Zealand and sponsored by the Government of Australia to promote intensified work on the Compliance Protocol. I will continue to devote personal attention to this issue and encourage other heads of state to do the same.

The United States continued to be a leading participant in the 30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 12-15, 1998, during which the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW proliferation and terrorism during the 1995 Plenary Session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year. At the 1998 plenary, at the behest of the United States, AG participants shared information on legal and regulatory efforts each member has taken to counter this threat. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national policies in these areas.

The Group also reaffirmed the participants' shared belief that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all States adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities support this goal. The AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC. The AG participants reaffirmed their belief that existing national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-and biological weapons-related items help to fulfill their obligations established under Article I of the CWC and Article III of the BWC that States

Parties not assist, in any way, the acquisition, manufacture, or use of chemical or biological weapons. Given this understanding, the AG participants also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing the Group's activities, now that the CWC has entered into force.

During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period. The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States continues to carefully control exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and to closely monitor activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also continue to implement the U.S. missile sanctions law. In April 1998, we imposed Category I missile sanctions against North Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile. Sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August 1997 for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items also remain in effect.

During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to work with each other and with potential non-Partner supplier and transshipment states to curb proliferation. Partners emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems and cooperated to interdict shipments intended for use in missile programs of concern.

The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's highly productive May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting. At the RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in an in-depth discussion of regional missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on South Asia. They also discussed steps Partners could take to increase transparency and outreach to nonmembers, and reached consensus to admit the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR. (Reports on their membership have been submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 73A of the Arms Export Control Act.)

In May 1998, the United States was an active participant in the German-hosted MTCR workshop on brokering, catch-all controls, and other export control issues. In June, the United States played a leading role at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshops on risk assessment in MTCR licensing decisions. The workshops involved the participation of MTCR Partners, as well as several non-MTCR members, and were successful in providing practical insights on export control and licensing issues. In particular, it helped participants identify risk factors and ways to assess them. The MTCR held its Thirteenth Plenary Meeting in Budapest,

Hungary on October 5-9. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information about activities and programs of missile proliferation concern and considered additional steps they can take, individually and collectively, to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, focusing in particular on the threat posed by missile-related activities in South and North East Asia and the Middle East.

During their discussions, the Partners gave special attention to North Korean (DPRK) missile activities, expressing serious concern about the DPRK's missile export practices and its efforts to acquire increasingly long-range missiles. The MTCR Plenary Chairman issued a statement reflecting the Partners' concerns, noting in particular that the Partners urged the DPRK to refrain from further flight tests of WMD-capable missiles and to cease exports of equipment and technology for such missiles. The Partners also agreed to maintain special scrutiny over their missile-related exports in order not to support North Korean missile development in any way.

At Budapest, the Partners also discussed ways to further the MTCR's efforts to promote openness and outreach to nonmembers, including by sponsoring additional seminars and workshops for members and nonmembers. The Partners supported a U.S. proposal for an MTCR-sponsored workshop in 1999 on "intangible transfers of technology," in order to develop a greater understanding of how proliferators misuse the Internet, scientific conferences, plant visits, and student exchange programs to acquire sensitive technology and to identify steps countries can take to address this problem. They also agreed to give further consideration to a technical-level workshop for border guards and Customs authorities on export control enforcement. In addition, the Partners noted China's increased willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on missile nonproliferation and export control issues, and renewed their previous invitation in principle to China to take the steps necessary to join the Regime.

The Partners also made additional progress at Budapest toward reformatting the MTCR Annex (the list of MTCR-controlled items) to improve clarity and uniformity of implementation while maintaining the coverage of the current Annex. They hope to complete this process in the near future.

During this reporting period, the United States also worked unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued missile nonproliferation discussions with China and North Korea and other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

In October 1998, the United States and the DPRK held a third round of missile talks, aimed at constraining DPRK missile production, deployment, flight-testing, and exports. The United States expressed serious concerns about North Korea's missile exports and indigenous missile activities, and made clear that we regard as highly destabilizing the DPRK's attempt on August 31 to use a Taepo Dong 1 missile to orbit a small satellite. We voiced strong opposition to North Korea's missile exports to other countries and made clear that further launches of long-range missiles or further exports of such missiles or their related technology would have very negative consequences for efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean relations. The talks concluded with an agreement to hold another round at the earliest practical date.

In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the United States continued its high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic missile development program. This effort has netted some positive results. For example, during this reporting period, Russia began implementing "catch-all" provisions imposing controls over the export of any material destined for a WMD or missile program, and provided detailed implementing guidance on these controls for Russian entities. Russia also agreed to meet regularly with the United States to discuss export control issues. In addition, at the summit in September, President Yeltsin and I announced the formation of seven bilateral working groups -- nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal compliance, conventional weapons, law enforcement, licensing, and customs -- for the rapid exchange of information on the wide range of nonproliferation issues.

In July, Russia launched special investigations of nine entities suspected of cooperating with foreign programs to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Russia subsequently took steps to end exports to Iran by three of these entities and to pursue two of the cases as smuggling issues. Consistent with the Russian action, the United States took action against seven of the nine entities in July pursuant in part to Executive Order 12938, as amended. We suspended all United States Government assistance to these seven entities and banned all U.S. exports to them and all of their imports to the United States."

http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/Clinton111298.html

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Bobert
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 10:10 AM

Dickey,

Maybe you weren't here back when Joe Offer stated that cut and posts longer than a screen's worth are taboo...

This is about the longest one since then so maybe Joe's request needs to be revisited...

A link is just fine... Or, as Amos usually does, a short synopsis or a ccouple paragrapghs and a link...

Just good Cat/cyber manners...

Now back to the food fight...

Bobert:]

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: beardedbruce
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 10:14 AM

I agree with Bobert on this one: Some quotes, and a link would have been better.

For one thing, most of those here will not bother to read what was posted, for fear of finding something they do not agree with. They can just ignore the clicky and attack the poster, instead.

"You can't teach a pig to sing"... Nor inform someone who wants to remain ignorant.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: TIA
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 10:32 AM

Amen BB

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:13 AM

Bobert: I appologize. I had that in mind when I was posting but I thought it would fit in one screen. I was in too much of a hurry and I failed to preview it. I will take more time in the future.

Now back to the good fight :D

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:24 AM

The situation in 1998 and th esituation in 2002 were quite different. I don't see the logic of prorposing that a description of conditions in the past which have changed shuld be used as an explanation for action in the present. SSeems to me it is ignoring time itself, always a mistake.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Donuel
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:26 AM

Today the Baghdad bridege that was bobmbed did not fall into the river like the one last week.

The surge is officially considered a failure by the Parliment since the green zone bombing.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:32 AM

Women in Iraq

Women in Iran

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:54 AM

Your bigotry is showing, good DIck. I spoke recently with an Iranian who is now a US citizen, and reurned to Tehran to visit his parents. The Shiite society of Iran is actually much more tolerant about Sharia law, and much mor e liberal towards women, then the Sunni.

None of which, BTW, has much bearing on the thread's title or topic.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Donuel
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 11:57 AM

I have a serious question.

What does a FINAL defeat have to look like for George W Bush to recognize it?

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 12:08 PM

Women in Iran, alternative view.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 12:16 PM

Amos: The friend was not a woman. And you call me biggoted? Ask an Iranian Woman

The Iraq Liberation Act
WILLIAM J. CLINTON, THE WHITE HOUSE, October 31, 1998.

Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers.
    Let me be clear on what the U.S. objectives are: The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region.
    The United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home. I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian make-up. Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else. The United States looks forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life.
    My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.
    In the meantime, while the United States continues to look to the Security Council's efforts to keep the current regime's behavior in check, we look forward to new leadership in Iraq that has the support of the Iraqi people. The United States is providing support to opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that could lead to a popularly supported government.
    On October 21, 1998, I signed into law the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, which made $8 million available for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition. This assistance is intended to help the democratic opposition unify, work together more effectively, and articulate the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a pluralistic, participa--tory political system that will include all of Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious groups. As required by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY 1998 (Public Law 105-174), the Department of State submitted a report to the Congress on plans to establish a program to support the democratic opposition. My Administration, as required by that statute, has also begun to implement a program to compile information regarding allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by Iraq's current leaders as a step towards bringing to justice those directly responsible for such acts.
    The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 provides additional, discretionary authorities under which my Administration can act to further the objectives I outlined above. There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These include the maintenance of U.N. Security Council support efforts to eliminate Iraq's weapons and missile programs and economic sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to international peace and security. United States support for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be attuned to what the opposition can effectively make use of as it develops over time. With those observations, I sign H.R. 4655 into law.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 01:26 PM

It seems very off-the-wall to me that offenses against women in Iraq's pre-invasion prison system are being blamed on Iran. Kinda like something your man Limbaugh would come up with.


A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Bobert
Date: 14 Apr 07 - 01:47 PM

Donuel,

As long as there is breath in the lungs of Bushites there will never be a "Final Defeat" because they are "true believers", much like the horses in "Animal Farm" and will keep respinning the story until they drop in the field... Maybe they will succeed, much the way partisans and folks of other motivation have done to sanitize the Bush administartion's failures much the way that Abe Lincoln's failures have been respun, sanitized to the point where now most folks who haven't really bothered to study history think that Lioncoln was so kinda hero...

But ya' have to hand it to revisionist... They sometimes can pull of making chicken salad oyut of chiken sh*t...

So there will never be a "Final Defeat"... The current crop of partisans will pass the stories down to their kids who will pass the stories down to their kids and... Historians will be bought much as flat earth scientist are have been bought during Bush's first 6 years...

And the beat goes on...

Bobert

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 15 Apr 07 - 12:01 AM

Amos: How did you make that connection? There is your use of a straw man issue again. No body said there was a connection but you imply someone did, compare them to Limbaugh.

Also you accuse me of being biggoted for showing the difference in the status of women in Iraq compared to women in Iran. As proof of this biggotry you say you asked a man about it and he said there is no problem. Your biggotry tells you that if a man says there is no problem, you can believe him but if a woman complains, she can't be believed.

In both instances, your logic is flawed.

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Dickey
Date: 15 Apr 07 - 12:14 AM

John F. Kerry 2003

"As I said last summer in New York, for Democrats to win America's confidence we must first convince Americans we will keep them safe. You can't do that by avoiding the subjects of national security, foreign policy and military preparedness. Nor can we let our national security agenda be defined by those who reflexively oppose any U.S. military intervention anywhere...who see U.S. power as mostly a malignant force in world politics...who place a higher value on achieving multilateral consensus than necessarily protecting our vital interests....
...Without question, we need to disarm Saddam Hussein. He is a brutal, murderous dictator, leading an oppressive regime .... He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation ... And now he is miscalculating America's response to his continued deceit and his consistent grasp for weapons of mass destruction .... So the threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real ...."

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Amos
Date: 15 Apr 07 - 01:13 AM

Oh, bullshit, Dickey. You take one picture of a hanged woman, presumably Iranian, and say it represents the status of women in Iran. That is an attempt at bigotry. I have no idea what you thought you were doing, but it was pure codswallop to make the insinuation.

It is not my strawman -- I just said it was the kind of thing your friend Rush would try to pull. Making sweeping nasty generalizations from precious little specifics and making them look like a widespread situation was a specialty of his, and yours. It's just primitive chaos-mongering. No-one should be fooled by it, althugh it can get people riled up.

A

Subject: RE: BS: Reviewing the Road to Iraq
From: Teribus
Date: 15 Apr 07 - 03:00 AM

100 up